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WELFARE DUALISM IN TWO SCANDINAVIAN WELFARE STATES: PUBLIC OPINION AND PARTY POLITICS

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Abstract

Recent research on the legitimacy of the welfare state has pointed to a potential negative impact of immigration. While much of this research has been concerned with a possible weakening of the general support for economic redistribution, we analyse popular support for the introduction of a two-tier (dualist) welfare system, and we focus on the interplay between public opinion and party competition. We use survey data from Denmark and Norway: two similar welfare states where elite politics on migration and welfare dualism has been markedly different over the last decade. We find that the level and structure of popular support for welfare dualism is fairly similar in the two countries, but that attitudes toward dualism has a stronger impact on left-right voting in Denmark where the politics of welfare dualism has been actively advocated by the populist right party and pursued by a right-wing coalition government.
Introduction

Immigration has become a hot topic in political and scholarly debates about the future of European welfare states. While some believe that immigration from non-western countries is the key to overcome the ensuing ageing crisis, others are worried that a high inflow of low-skilled immigrants will have negative impact on the economic sustainability of redistributive welfare states. The demand for low-skilled workers tends to be limited in the high wage/high productivity labour markets found in many European countries, and generous welfare benefits represent a disincentive for immigrants to search for paid employment. If, as a consequence, the labour-force participation of immigrants remains relatively low and the take-up of social transfers high, it could reinforce long term fiscal problems and the need for welfare retrenchment (Koopmanns 2009).

Another source of concern is related to public opinion and the legitimacy of the welfare state. In a much cited speech, the conservative British politician David Willetts claimed that popular support for redistribution is dependent upon a general perception among the public that “recipients are people like themselves, facing difficulties which they themselves could face. If values become more diverse, if lifestyles become more differentiated, then it becomes more difficult to sustain the legitimacy of a universal risk-pooling welfare state” (cited after Goodhart 2004). In a similar vein, scholars in the political economy tradition have - with reference to the US experience - argued that increased ethnic heterogeneity in Europe will tend to undermine class solidarity and lead to a reduced demand for redistribution by the median voter – in particular in a situation as described above where immigrants and ethnic minority groups are strongly overrepresented among social security recipients (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). These and similar claims have spurred a large body of research trying to confirm or reject the hypothesis about a negative effect of immigration and increasing ethnic heterogeneity on social solidarity.

In this paper we use data from Denmark and Norway to analyse popular support for a policy option which is sometimes referred to as welfare chauvinism; but which we prefer to call welfare dualism. By this we mean the introduction of a two-tier welfare system where the access to benefits and/or the generosity of benefits is being systematically differentiated
between immigrants and the general population. A move towards welfare dualism is one of several possible strategies for adapting mature welfare states to the (real or perceived) challenges posed by mass immigration, and in some European countries this line of policy has been actively advocated and pursued in the last decade (Emmenegger and Careja 2012).

The thematic focus of our study deviates in two ways from most of the existing literature on immigration/welfare attitudes. Firstly, rather than looking for variation in the level of popular support for the welfare state and economic redistribution in general, we concentrate our analysis on attitudes towards a particular policy option, welfare dualism. We believe that a resort to welfare dualism is a more plausible popular reaction to immigration than a general weakening of the preference for redistribution among the native population. Secondly, we want to focus on the interplay between party politics and public opinion. Much of the existing research in this area has been sociological in orientation and concerned with explaining why certain segments of the population are receptive to welfare chauvinism, and/or with finding a systematic link between broad welfare regime characteristics and aggregate levels of support for welfare chauvinism. Instead we attempt to bring politics back in by drawing attention to the role played by agenda setting, party competition and policy bundling.

In order to gain insight into the interplay between party politics and public opinion, we have chosen to concentrate our study on two Scandinavian welfare states that are roughly similar on important structural dimensions - social structure, political system, welfare regime characteristics and the exposure to immigration. But the two countries differ markedly in the political saliency of immigration and integration issues and the actual policies pursued in the last decade. More specifically we maintain that Denmark distinguishes itself significantly from Norway in the following three aspects: a) the populist right has adopted a platform based almost exclusively on nationalism and welfare dualism, b) immigration and integration policy has for the last ten years taken centre stage as a positional issue that divides the Danish party system into two competing blocks, left and right, and c) explicitly dualist policies have been implemented in practice. So far, neither of this has happened in Norway as we shall describe in more detail below.

In the empirical part of the paper we first compare the general level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. Is the level of support for welfare dualism among Danish and Norwegian voters. 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markedly higher in Denmark where such policies have been pursued in practice? Secondly we
analyse the structure of support for dualist welfare policies with particular attention to the
traditional supporters of the redistributive welfare state: low skilled workers. Is there a schism
within the pro-redistribution and pro-welfare state camp concerning welfare rights for
immigrants? Finally we study the links between support for welfare dualism and party choice.
Are those who support welfare dualism less inclined to vote for socialist parties and more
inclined to vote for a right-wing populist party? On all three counts we are interested to find
out if and to what extent the patterns differ in accordance with marked differences in elite
politics between Denmark and Norway.

**Voter preferences, party competition and welfare dualism**

*Social class and the immigration/welfare nexus*

The debate about welfare and immigration involves two basic value-dimensions in western
societies. One concerns redistribution and the degree to which government should take
responsibility for individual welfare (collectivism versus individualism), while the second
concerns adherence to an inclusive versus an exclusive view of society (Van Oorschot 2006).

It is a well-established finding in political sociology that low-skilled and low-income voters
are inclined to support economic redistribution and to vote for left wing parties that have
traditionally supported generous welfare policies (e.g. Dallinger 2010, Svalfors 1997). It is an
almost equally well-known and well-established finding that people with low educational
credentials tend to hold more negative attitudes towards immigrants and to be more sceptical
towards liberal immigration policies than their better educated compatriots (e.g. Sides and
Citrin 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).

While the class gradient with respect to the preference economic redistribution has a
straightforward and in the literature largely undisputed explanation in terms of economic
interests, the explanation for the positive effect of education on the tolerance for migration
and ethnic minorities is highly contested. Some believe in a cultural explanation emphasizing
the ability of education to widen the horizon and change the value orientation of the
individual (Gaasholt and Togeby 1995, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), while others
emphasize an interest based explanation in terms of competition for scarce resources between
low-skilled natives and (low-skilled) immigrants (Hernes and Knudsen 1990, Mayda 2006).
In an early contribution to this literature Jensen and Poulsen (1990) pointed out a further regularity in Danish opinion data that has later been confirmed by studies in other countries (see for instance Derks 2004; 2006; van der Waal et al. 2010 and Mewes and Mau forthcoming). Among the highly educated part of the electorate a collectivistic (pro-redistribution) orientation goes together with positive views on immigrants and a preference for lax immigration rules, while scepticism towards immigrants is almost exclusively found among those highly educated who at the same time oppose economic redistribution. This is not the case to the same extent among the less educated strata of the population. Among the less educated a significant proportion combine a strong preference for redistribution with negative attitudes towards immigrants and a preference for strict immigration policies.

Again the interpretation of this difference in alignment of the two attitudinal dimensions according to educational background is controversial. Some adhere to variations of the cultural explanation. Either the combination of collectivism and negative attitudes towards immigrants is simply seen as being inconsistent and a consequence of low political competence, or it is argued that education produces changes in values and beliefs that involve a higher tolerance for people with a different cultural background (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Federico 2004 and van der Waal et al 2010).

Jensen and Poulsen (1990) and Derks (2004; 2006) offer interpretations that emphasize the role of social stratification and combine elements of interest based and a value based explanations. Jensen and Poulsen (1990) suggest that collectivist/pro-welfare attitudes come in two different versions that are linked to conflicting notions of social solidarity: a universalistic and unconditional version found primarily among the highly educated, and a more discriminatory and conditional (but no less rational) version prevalent among the less educated and privileged segments of the population. In a similar vein Derks (2004; 2006) suggests that scepticism towards immigrants among less privileged strata is a defensive reaction to protect the resources and the status that follow from being member of a national welfare community.

Recent research that has attempted to unravel the mechanisms behind the coexistence pro-welfare and anti-immigration sentiments among less the privileged population strata have produced mixed results. Based on an analysis of Dutch survey data, Van der Waal et al. (2010) conclude in favour of a primarily cultural explanation, while Mewes and Mau
(forthcoming) find support for an interest based explanation in their analysis of cross-national data from the fourth wave of the European Social Survey.

Irrespective of the precise mechanisms that are responsible for the exclusive orientation within the group of low educated collectivists, welfare dualism and a two-tier welfare state would seem to suit the preferences of this group particularly well. Redistribution and welfare benefits are upheld for the citizens of the country, but denied the newcomers. The economic interests of low status natives remain unchallenged, and immigrants are treated as being less deserving than the rest of the population.

The politics of immigration and party choice

In this paper we will also start out by studying the level and structure of support for welfare dualism, but rather than to contribute to the search for a more adequate sociological explanation we will expand on the literature by exploring the potential political implications of the tendency for low status groups to combine pro-welfare and anti-immigrant attitudes.

We take as our point of departure the suggestion that mass immigration could have a negative impact on welfare state support through the dynamics of party competition and a “policy bundling” effect. The idea is that the politics of immigration adds a new dimension to party competition that distracts attention from the politics of redistribution and threatens to split the traditional voter constituency behind left parties who are assumed to be the main defenders of a redistributive welfare state (see e.g. Banting et al. 2006, Roemer et al 2007, Vernby and Finseraas 2010).

As already discussed, it is a well-established finding in political sociology that low-skilled and low-income voters who are inclined to support economic redistribution, also tend to have negative attitudes towards immigrants and oppose liberal immigration policies. As immigration issues increase in saliency, these voters will be attracted to anti-immigration parties of the political right and be less likely to vote for left parties that advocate a combination of generous welfare arrangements and relatively liberal immigration and integration policies (van der Brug and van Spanje 2009). In theory left parties could meet the challenge by adjusting their position on immigration issues, but this might be perceived as politically unacceptable by party members and party officials, and it could alienate other (more well-educated) segments of left voters for whom pro-welfare and pro-immigration attitudes are presumably closely connected. In addition, social democratic parties often seek
alliances with New Left parties, and such coalitions might be more difficult to build if the social democrats move sharply to the right on immigration issues (Bale 2003). The dilemma that confronts social democratic and other parties to the left is precisely captured in the study by Jensen and Poulsen (1990): the voter constituency for a redistributive welfare state consists of two groups (low skilled and high skilled collectivists, respectively), that tend to form opposite poles in the debate on immigration.

In other words: the electoral support for the pro-welfare parties of the left is likely to be eroded when populist right parties bring immigration issues to the forefront of political competition (Bale 2003). The fact that populist right parties often combine their anti-immigration agenda with a promise to defend core programs of the welfare state (see e.g. Kitschelt 1997, Andersen and Bjørklund 2000, 2008), has led some observers to suggest that parliamentary support for existing welfare institutions could be unchanged or even strengthened by the electoral success of the populist right (Andersen 2006). However, this argument fails to take into account the possibility that the populist right might actively pursue and under certain conditions succeed in gaining broader parliamentary support for welfare dualist policies (Bale 2003).

The two cases: structural similarities and differences in elite politics

Norway and Denmark are typically ranked among the most generous and redistributive welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; Scruggs 2006), and also the respective party systems are considered to be basically similar (Heidar 2004).

Both countries have experienced a substantial growth in the number of immigrants over the past decades and the size of the immigrant population is currently roughly similar. Key figures on the current size of the immigrant population and employment rates for both immigrants and the general population are presented in the appendix table A1. It shows that Norway has a higher population of foreign born individuals but Denmark has the highest share of non-EU nationals residing in the country. In both countries the labour market participation of immigrants of non-Western origin is high compared to most European countries, while it is at the same time significantly lower than among the general population. A similar pattern can be observed for unemployment rates. Unemployment rates among immigrants are fairly modest from a general European perspective but still substantially higher than the rates prevailing among the respective “native” populations, and hence labour
market integration of immigrants has been a source of concern in both countries (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012).

However, even despite these basic similarities the politics of immigration has played out differently in the two countries.

In Denmark the populist right party, Danish People’s Party, has since its inauguration in 1996 combined aggressive opposition to immigration and multiculturalism with a general pro-welfare state position, in particular on issues like health care, elderly care and pensions (Andersen and Bjørklund 2000). In addition to put a brake on immigration, the party has actively advocated the introduction of welfare dualism, giving newly arrived immigrants access to only a restricted part of the welfare state. The party has over period of ten years – from 2001 to 2011, played a key role in Danish politics as a supporting party for the reigning right-wing government. With the support of the Danish People’s Party this right-wing coalition prevailed in three consecutive parliamentary elections, and during its ten years in office it implemented harsh anti-immigration measures and embarked on a route towards welfare dualism (Bale 2003). In addition to a tightening of the conditions for family unification, stricter rules for granting asylum as well as the naturalization of foreign residents, a dual system of social assistance was introduced as part of a larger reform in 2002. Immigrants with less than seven years of residence in the country are denied access to the general social assistance scheme and referred to a special scheme that offers significantly lower benefits (Andersen 2007).

In later years both the Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party have moved somewhat to the right on the immigration dimension, but certainly not far enough to threaten the position of Danish People’s Party’s as the anti-immigration party par excellence, and both parties have together with their non-socialist allies continued to oppose the dualization of social assistance benefits that was introduced in 2002 (Jønsson and Petersen 2012). Following the general election in 2011 where the right-wing coalition lost by a narrow margin, these two parties have formed a coalition government with the Social-Liberal Party and supported by the Red-Green Alliance – two parties that have strongly and consistently favoured lax immigration policies and a multiculturalist approach to integration. It is therefore no surprise that the new centre-left government has removed the discriminatory policies from 2012.
Summing up we can say that over the last ten years immigration policy and welfare dualism has taken centre stage as a positional issue that divides the Danish party system into two competing blocks, and explicitly dualist policies have been implemented in practice.

Also in Norway we can talk about a general political drift towards more strict immigration and integration policies, albeit with a lag and significantly weaker compared to Denmark (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012). The position as the strongest anti-immigration party is held by a populist right party, the Progress Party. However, the Progress Party has not to the same extent as the Danish People’s Party changed its original low-taxation-small-state platform to become an unambiguous defender of the existing welfare state (Andersen and Bjørklund 2008). Its position on general welfare policy is somewhat ambiguous (sending mixed signals), and its rhetoric on immigration issues is less aggressive than that of the Danish People’s Party.

Unlike its Danish counterpart the Progress Party has not been allowed to play the same pivotal role as the supporting party for a right-wing government. The non-socialist coalition government that was in office from 2001-2005 did not make itself dependent on parliamentary support from the Progress Party, and in particular the two minor coalition partners (the Christian People’s Party and the Liberal Party) distance themselves strongly from the anti-immigration agenda of the Progress Party. Also within the centre-left coalition that came into power in 2005, there are tensions over immigration policy. While the Labour Party has on several occasions taken initiatives to tighten asylum polices, the Socialist People’s Party positions itself as being particularly liberal on immigration and integration issues (Aardal 2011: 111).

In sum we can say that immigration issues have not taken centre stage as the most important dividing line between the two competing party blocks, and the idea of introducing a two-tier welfare state has so far not reached the political agenda of any Norwegian political party. Instead, shifting Norwegian governments have promoted activation and workfare and a strong focus on duties for both immigrants and ethnic Norwegians (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012).

The different policy agendas and routes pursued by the political elites in two advanced welfare states, which in most respects are quite similar, makes a comparison of voter attitudes particularly interesting.
Data and measures

Our data derive from a comparative survey on welfare opinion developed through collaboration between welfare researchers in a number of North European countries. The data were collected through postal surveys to a representative sample of the respective populations. In Denmark data were collected 2008 and in Norway in early 2009. Although the response rates were low – just about 30 per cent in Norway and well above 40 per cent in Denmark, the net samples are fairly representative in terms of age, gender, geographical location and measured socioeconomic characteristics (see table A1 in the appendix for descriptive statistics).

We focus on two dependent variables, support for welfare dualism and party preference. Support for welfare dualism is derived from an item where respondents were asked to evaluate a statement that “Refugees and immigrants should not be granted the same right to social assistance as Danes/Norwegians”. The respondents were asked to indicate a value on a traditional five point Likert scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Variables measuring party preference are derived from respondents’ declared party choice in the previous parliamentary election (2005 in Norway and 2007 in Denmark).

Our main independent variables are education and preference for redistribution. Education is a binary variable measuring whether the respondent has at least four years of tertiary education. Preference for redistribution is measured by a conventional question about support for government efforts to reduce income differentials between rich and poor. We have recoded the original Likert scale to a binary variable where those who agree strongly and agree are coded as being in favour of redistribution. The remaining variables are for the most part self-explanatory, and those that are not are explained in the text. Descriptive statistics by country are presented in table A1 in the Appendix. We rely on simple cross-tables and linear regression to evaluate our hypotheses.

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2 The team responsible for designing a master version of the survey consisted of Jørgen Goul Andersen, Wim van Oorschot, Christian Albrekt Larsen and Axel West Pedersen.
3 We believe that this question is simpler and has higher face validity as a measure of welfare dualism than an alternative question included in the welfare module of the fourth wave of the European Social Survey (see Mewes and Mau forthcoming for a study using this alternative measure).
4 “It is a task of the government to reduce income differences between people with high income and people with low income”. 
Empirical results

Is popular support for welfare dualism stronger in Denmark than in Norway?

We start by comparing the degree of support for welfare dualism in the two countries. Table 1 reports the distribution of reactions in Norway and Denmark to our main measure of support for welfare dualism in relation to social assistance benefits. The distributions are fairly similar, although support for welfare dualism appears to be slightly more widespread in the Danish sample. While 40 per cent of our Danish sample report to agree completely or partly with the idea of withholding social assistance from immigrants, 37 per cent of the Norwegian sample do the same; and a larger share of the Norwegian sample say they disagree partly or completely with this idea (42 per cent versus 35 per cent in Denmark). However, although these differences are statistically significant according to conventional criteria we must nevertheless conclude that there are not large aggregate differences in voter attitudes between the two countries.

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<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree completely</td>
<td>14 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree partly</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>23 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree partly</td>
<td>14 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree completely</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUM</td>
<td>99 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>1423</td>
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People might have different reasons for agreeing to policies that discriminate against immigrants in the welfare system. If people believe that the immigrants themselves are mainly to blame for their lower labour force participation, this can serve to justify discriminatory policy measures – both in political rhetoric and in popular thinking. We have therefore examined responses to a question about immigrants’ work ethics. The results that are presented in figure 1. The overall impression is that there are modest differences between Norway and Denmark in the views on this more cognitively oriented question. The Danish sample reveals a somewhat more negative view on the work ethics of immigrants as 29 per
cent say that the work ethics of immigrants is poorer compared to the native population while 23 per cent of the Norwegian sample agree to the same statement. Below we include this variable in an attempt to model individual variation in the support for welfare dualist policies.

Table 2: Views on the work ethics of immigrants: ‘Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In general, immigrants have poorer work ethics than Danes/Norwegians’

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<th>Denmark</th>
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<tr>
<td>Agree completely</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree partly</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>31 %</td>
<td>30 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree partly</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree completely</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>27 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>101 %</td>
<td>99 %</td>
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<td>N</td>
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Is there systematic variation in the structure of support?

We now move on to analyse how the support for welfare dualism varies between different subgroups in the two countries. In line with previous research in the field we are particularly interested in whether the idea of offering poorer welfare rights to immigrants is attractive to parts of the constituency that otherwise tends to support a redistributive welfare state.

In table 3 we show the level of support for welfare chauvinist policies when the respective samples have been broken down according to the respondents’ level of education and their attitude towards economic redistribution in general. The main pattern is the same in the two countries: Welfare dualism has significantly more support among respondents with low education (below college level) than among respondents with high education. 44 per cent of the low educated group in Denmark and 43 per cent of the low educated in Norway agree completely or partly with the dualist policy option. Among respondents with higher education, support for welfare dualism is significantly lower, particularly among those highly educated respondents who support of redistributive policies. In this collectively oriented subgroup only 19 per cent (Denmark) and 24 per cent (Norway) agree to the idea of introducing or maintaining a discriminatory social assistance regime. In other words, within the more educated group there is a strong negative association between a collectivistic pro-redistribution orientation and support for welfare dualism. Among the less educated the
pattern is quite different. Here there appears to be only a weak association between attitudes to redistribution and welfare dualism in Norway and no association in Denmark.

This implies that we - in line with previous research in the field (Jensen and Poulsen 1990 and Van der Waal et al. 2011a and 2011b) - find signs of an interaction effect between education and redistribution orientation on the support for welfare dualism – particularly in Denmark. While a collectivistic orientation tends to preclude welfare dualism among the highly educated it does not do so to the same extent - if at all - among people with low education.

Table 3. Share who agree (completely or partly) with the statement that refugees and immigrants should not have the same right to social assistance as Danes/Norwegians. Per cent.

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<th></th>
<th>Denmark (N=1464)</th>
<th>Norway (N=1187)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher education + anti redistribution</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education + pro redistribution</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All higher education</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower education + anti redistribution</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower education + pro redistribution</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All lower education</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following we pursue the study of the structure of support for a dualist welfare policy with the help of a multivariate regression analysis using as the dependent variable the full range of answers to the original question on whether to discriminate against immigrants in the social assistance scheme - from completely agree (with an associated value of ‘5’) to completely disagree (with an associated value of ‘1’).

In the multivariate models shown in table 4 we have in addition to our key independent variables – education, preference for redistribution and an interaction term - included a set of control variables that are known to potentially correlate with welfare and immigration attitudes: age, gender, income and dependency on public transfers.  

The results show that neither the level of household income nor dependency on welfare benefits appears to have a statistical relationship with welfare dualism when the other variables are controlled for. On the other hand it turns out that welfare dualism receives significantly more support from the elderly (above age 65) in both countries, and that

---

5 Household income is in both countries measured on an ordinal scale running from 1-10, while dependency on welfare benefits reflects whether respondents currently receive some kind of public income replacement (excluding old age pensions).
particularly in Denmark there is a clear tendency that men are more inclined to embrace welfare dualism than women.

Most importantly we find that the coefficients for our key variables – education (low=1), preference for redistribution (yes=1) – are statistically significant even after controlling for these other background factors. In both countries we find that welfare dualism is generally more widespread among people with low education (particularly so in Norway), and that there is a negative association with support for redistribution. Only in Denmark, however, do we find a strongly significant coefficient for the interaction between low education and support for redistribution. This shows that in Denmark, welfare dualism has a differential appeal to “redistributionists” depending on their level of education – or vice-versa a differential appeal to the highly educated depending on their general attitudes towards redistribution. In Norway on the other hand, the pattern of association is more simple and additive with a particularly strong difference in support for dualism according to the level of education.\footnote{A pooled analysis (not reported here) shows that the differences between Denmark and Norway in the strength of all these three coefficients are indeed statistically significant as indicated in table 3.}

\textit{Table 4. Results from OLS regression with the degree of support for welfare dualism as dependent variable.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>NOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age&lt;35</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age&gt;65</td>
<td>0.364*</td>
<td>0.332*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.214*</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving transfers</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low education</td>
<td>\textbf{0.243}*</td>
<td>0.617*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>\textbf{-0.811}*</td>
<td>-0.284*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education*Redistribution</td>
<td>\textbf{0.595}*</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants’ work ethics</td>
<td>0.454*</td>
<td>0.428*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.801</td>
<td>2.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square adj.</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# and * indicate respectively significance levels 0.01 and 0.05.

Danish coefficients marked with bold typeface indicate that they are statistically different from the corresponding Norwegian coefficients.
These findings are in line with our initial hypothesis that the education-related split of the collectivist camp will be more pronounced in Denmark where welfare dualism has been put firmly on the political agenda.

In model II we have finally included the variable measuring the respondent’s view of the work ethics of immigrants (five point Likert scale) as a potential intervening factor. As one would expect, the coefficient for this variable turns out to be highly significant, and its inclusion leads to a very significant increase in explained variance. This suggests that scepticism towards immigrants’ work ethics is an important part of the rationale for supporting welfare dualism. If one believes that immigrants exhibit a weaker commitment to work, the idea will easily follow that they are themselves to be blamed for being unemployed and less deserving than “native” beneficiaries. Similar mechanisms have been invoked to explain racist welfare attitudes among white Americans (see for instance Gilens 1999). However, we should also note that although all the other coefficients are significantly reduced, most continue to be statistically significant after the inclusion of this variable, and the same goes for the differences between the Danish and Norwegian coefficients on our three key variables.

In order to facilitate a more substantive evaluation of the observed differences between the Danish and Norwegian samples we have in table 5 used the coefficients from Model I to calculate the predicted level of support for welfare dualism in the four population subgroups defined by the two dimensions: education and preference for redistribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher education + anti redistribution</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education + pro redistribution</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower education + anti redistribution</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower education + pro redistribution</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here it is similarity in the pattern of support for welfare dualism that appears to dominate. The ranking of the four groups in terms of support for welfare dualism is the same in both countries, and even the predicted level of support for welfare dualism is rather similar in at least three of the four groups. Among the group with low education and a preference for redistribution that we have be mainly interested in, the support for welfare dualism is equally high in both countries. The only group where the support for welfare dualism is substantively
higher in Denmark than in Norway are people with higher education who do not favour economic redistribution (a score of 2.96 in Denmark compared to 2.57 in Norway). One should note, however, that the share reporting to generally support economic redistribution is significantly lower in Denmark than in Norway (see appendix table A2). Hence, a possible explanation for the higher level of support for welfare dualism among well-educated non-redistributionists in Denmark (and the very low support among the pro-redistributionists) could be that the highly politicised discourse on immigration has led some highly educated to not only support welfare dualism but also to turn their back on economic redistribution.

Welfare dualism and party choice

In the final part of the empirical analysis we investigate the links between welfare dualism and party choice. Are voters who combine a preference for redistribution with welfare dualism more likely to support the respective right wing populist parties and less inclined to vote for any of the parties in the left-wing block? Is this tendency stronger in Denmark where welfare dualism has been on the political agenda for almost a decade, and could this be part of the explanation for the repeated electoral successes of the right-wing block over the last decade?

We examine these issues from two angles. First we analyse how the attitudinal dispositions – preference for redistribution and welfare dualism – are associated with the propensity to vote for the respective populist right party as well as for the entire left wing block. Second we compare the attitudinal profiles of those who report to have voted for the social democratic party, the populist right party and the biggest non-socialist party in the two countries.

We start by investigating the link between welfare dualism and the propensity to vote for the populist right since this would appear to be a main mechanism by which electoral support for the traditional pro-welfare state parties might have been eroded as a result of the welfare dualism discourse. In the 2007 election the Danish People’s party received 13.8 per cent of the vote, while the Progress Party in Norway received 22.1 per cent of the votes in the 2005 election. In our sample only 8.9 per cent of the Danish respondents report to have voted for
the Danish People’s Party while 18.9 per cent of the Norwegian respondents report to have voted for the Progress Party.  

In table 6 we show the share who voted for the populist right party (the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party) in the last parliamentary election. The sample is first broken down into four groups according to education and preference for economic redistribution. Within these four groups we further distinguish between those who support welfare dualism and those who do not, and show the respective percentage of voters for the populist right. In order to assess the degree of association between support for welfare dualism and the probability to vote for the populist right for each subgroup, we show in the far right-side column the absolute percentage difference (and the corresponding odds ratio). 

Table 6. Per cent reporting to have voted for the populist right party in the last parliamentary election – by voter group and support for welfare dualism. Denmark N=1299, Norway N=1016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not dualist</td>
<td>Dualist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education + anti redistribution</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education + pro redistribution</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower education + anti redistribution</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower education + pro redistribution</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>5 %</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the electoral support for the Norwegian Progress Party is by far the highest, the degree of linear association with welfare dualism is rather similar in the two countries. The Danish Peoples Party is more of a single issue party, and this is reflected in the fact that the support for this party is extremely low among voters who reject welfare dualism. However, also

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7 Our figures are consistent with a general finding in Danish electoral research that opinion polls tend to underestimate the electoral support for the Danish People’s Party.

8 While the absolute percentage difference measures the degree of linear association, the odds ratio is a non-linear measure. In our comments to table 6 and 7 we give preference to the former.
among welfare dualists the share who vote for the populist right is very significantly lower in Denmark than in Norway.

In both countries individuals who combine low education with a preference for economic redistribution constitute the group where support for welfare dualism is most effectively mobilised into vote for the populist right. Somewhat surprisingly, there is no indication that the Danish Peoples Party is more successful in attracting this segment of the voters than the Norwegian Progress Party. The degree of association with welfare dualism is about the same in these two subgroups when looking at the absolute differences (21 per cent in Denmark and 20 per cent in Norway), but one should note that the corresponding odds ratios differ dramatically (7.8 versus 2.9).

However, as pointed out by Bale (2003), in countries like Denmark where right-wing governments have come to power with support from the populist right, also the more mainstream right-wing parties have embraced welfare dualism, and therefore the electoral gain for the political right as a whole – and the associated loss for the political left - will not necessarily depend on an increased vote for the populist right party.

In table 7 we show the share who voted for one of the parties in the left block in each of the two countries by the same breakdown as in table 5. It confirms that support for welfare dualism is associated with a lower propensity to vote for the left bloc in both countries. However the association is generally stronger in Denmark compared to Norway – a finding that is consistent with our claim that immigration policy in general and welfare dualism in particular has been a key positional issue in the electoral competition between the two party blocks over the last decade. The association is particularly strong among the low educated, pro-redistribution group in Denmark where support for the left block is 38 percentage points lower among welfare dualists compared to non-dualists (with an odds ratio of 0.18). The corresponding difference in Norway is 26 per cent (odds ratio 0.35). Also the group of individuals that combine higher education with a preference for redistribution has fairly polarized voting preferences in both countries depending on their view on welfare dualism.

Table 7. Percent who report to have voted for the left block in the last parliamentary election - by voter group and support for welfare dualism. Denmark N=1299, Norway N=1016.

9 Just above 50 per cent of the Danish sample report to have voted for one of the left parties while 53 per cent of the Norwegian respondents do the same – indicating a certain overrepresentation of voters for the left block in the Danish sample.
Finally we investigate whether differences in elite politics are reflected in the attitudinal profiles of voters for different parties in the two countries. Figure 1 shows the mean scores of the voters for each respective party on three attitudinal dimensions that are all measured on a 5 point scale: preference for redistribution, view on the work ethics of immigrants and support for welfare dualism. In addition to the two populist right parties the figure shows the profile of voters for the two social democratic parties (The Social Democratic Party and the Labour Party) and for the two most important non-socialist parties (The Liberal Party, “Venstre” and the Conservative Party, “Høyre”).

As one can see the profiles are fairly similar across countries for the corresponding parties. On the redistribution dimension the social democratic parties score highest followed by the populist right parties, with the more mainstream non-socialist party scoring lowest. On the two attitudinal dimensions related to immigrants the populist right score highest, followed by the mainstream non-socialist party.

However, there are also some notable country differences. The support for welfare dualism is significantly higher among the voters for the Danish People’s Party and the Liberal Party compared to their Norwegian counterparts. Even the voters for the Social Democrats in Denmark are on average more inclined towards welfare dualism than the voters for the Norwegian Labour Party. A possible explanation is that many of the most pro-immigrant...
voters have left the Social Democrats in favour of one of the coalition partners - the Danish Social-Liberal Party and the Red-Green Alliance\textsuperscript{10} - that have distanced themselves more clearly from the anti-immigration and welfare dualist agenda of the Danish People’s Party and the right-wing block.

\textsuperscript{10} As one should expect, the voters for both these two parties score extremely low on welfare dualism – 2.2 and 1.5 respectively.
Figure 1. Mean score of the voters for the respective parties on three attitudinal dimensions.

**Denmark**

![Denmark chart]

**Norway**

![Norway chart]
Discussion

Many observers have predicted that immigration will put the legitimacy of the welfare state under pressure and undermine the electoral support for parties that favour economic redistribution. Andersen (2006) has argued that the Danish experience tells another lesson. While many working class voters who are sceptical to immigration, have turned to the Danish People’s Party, this party has in its competition for voters with the Social Democrats become “a guardian of social democratic welfare ideals” (p.21). The effect of immigration has in this perspective not undermined but further strengthened the electoral support for the welfare state. But while the Danish People’s Party has indeed - in its role as supporting party for a right-wing government - been keen to reject more general cut-backs in core welfare programs, the party has been able to carry out much of its anti-immigration agenda including the introduction of explicitly dualist welfare policies. In Norway the Progress Party has not to the same extent redefined its platform in purely welfare chauvinist terms, and - more importantly – it has not been allowed to play the role as an indispensable coalition partner for a non-socialist government and to see explicitly dualist policies implemented in practice.

Despite these very significant differences in elite politics and the actual policies pursued in the two countries over the last decade, we find that the general level support for welfare dualism is almost equally strong in both countries. In both countries support for welfare dualism appears to be associated with a rather widespread belief that immigrants are less committed to work than the majority population, and this is likely to be one of the main reasons why immigrants tend to be perceived as less deserving of welfare state support (see Gilens 1999). This seems to contradict the expectation by some observers that the “universal” Scandinavian welfare states should be particularly resilient to anti-solidarity effects and welfare chauvinism (Banting 2000; Andersen 2006).

Also regarding the structure of support the similarities tend to dominate. Our analyses confirm the pattern shown in previous research both within and outside Scandinavia that the issue of welfare dualism represents a potential schism within the group of traditional welfare state supporters. Those among the well-educated who favour redistribution also tend to reject welfare dualism, whereas redistributionists with low education are much more inclined to embrace the idea of a two-tier welfare state. This differential attitudinal pattern according to
education is, however, more pronounced in Denmark as was confirmed by the finding of a significant interaction effect between low education and preference for redistribution.

Somewhat surprisingly we find that it is not among individuals with lower education that the support for welfare dualism is stronger in Denmark than in Norway. The only of our four groups where support for welfare dualism is clearly higher in Denmark, is the group of highly educated who reject economic redistribution. A possible explanation could be that the immigration discourse in Denmark has led to a genuine decline in social solidarity and support for redistribution among more well-off segments – in line with the predictions of Alesina and Glaeser (2004).

Our analysis of the relationship between support for welfare dualism and party choice gives indirect support for the claim that the political polarisation around this issue in Denmark has helped the right-wing block to prevail in three consecutive elections over the last decade. This is so even if the Danish People’s Party has remained smaller and does not appear to capitalise more on welfare dualism than the Norwegian Progress Party. The point is first of all that the Norwegian Progress Party competes much more with the other non-socialist parties for voters - particularly the Conservative Party (see Andersen and Bjørklund 2008) and secondly that the issue of welfare dualism appears to have attracted voters to the entire right-wing block in Denmark - as suggested by Bale (2003).

Let us conclude with a more general theoretical reflection. It is striking how substantive differences in elite politics between these two countries do not appear to correspond with large difference in public opinion towards welfare dualism. One could easily take this as evidence against a “demand-side” perspective on politics according to which political elites are constrained to pursue policies that satisfy the preferences of the electorate and the median voter in particular (Downs 1957). Paradoxically the pattern we find is equally at odds with the radically opposite perspective whereby voters tend to adjust their policy views to contemporary elite rhetoric (Zaller 1992) or the positions taken the by their favourite party (Slothuus 2007; Jensen and Thomsen 2011). The lack of a simple correspondence between elite politics and public opinion is a challenge to both perspectives, but it is in our opinion more easily reconciled with a modified version of the “demand side” view. The downsian prediction that parties will converge around the policy preferences of the median voter is based on the assumption that the underlying policy space is one-dimensional, and it is a well-
known analytical result that such a unique, equilibrium solution does not apply in a multidimensional policy space (Riker and Ordeshook 1973; Hinich 1977).

The growing importance of the immigration dimension in Scandinavian politics is not only likely to have distracted attention from the traditional redistribution/welfare state dimension – as has previously been suggested (Banting et al. 2006; Roemer et al 2007; Vernby and Finseraas 2010). It has created a multidimensional policy space in which the strategic game between the parties becomes more open and indeterminate even if the policy preferences of the voters on each of the two dimensions are fairly well-defined and stable.

References


Appendix

Table A1: Background statistics on immigrant population and labour force participation in 2009. Per cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign population</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born population</td>
<td>8 %</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third country nationals (non-EU)*</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate foreign-born</td>
<td>67 %</td>
<td>69 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate native-born</td>
<td>77 %</td>
<td>77 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate foreign-born</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate native-born</td>
<td>6 %</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Foreign population refers to non-citizens with a usual residence in the country as a proportion of the total population. Foreign-born population includes citizens born outside the country.

Sources: OECD.Stat database (http://stats.oecd.org), and * http://www.mipex.eu.

Table A2. Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 65</td>
<td>59 %</td>
<td>56 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 65</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>48 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>7,1203</td>
<td>8,4527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social transfers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>87 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>61 %</td>
<td>57 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>39 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference for redistribution</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>56 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>1372</td>
<td>1109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>