DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN AN ERA OF SECURITISATION:
The Case of Denmark

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Abstract
This article uses the case of Denmark to critically discuss key assumptions in the theoretical literature on dual citizenship. When Denmark surprisingly accepted dual citizenship in 2015, the decision reflected two distinct lines of argument: first, accepting dual citizenship would allow Danes living abroad to keep their Danish citizenship; second, because it is considered illegitimate to make people stateless, allowing dual citizenship would simultaneously allow for citizenship revocation of dual citizens who engage in or support acts of terror. This rationale stands in striking contrast to how dual citizenship has been previously theorised. The gradual acceptance of dual citizenship in Western countries since the early 1990s has been seen either as a symptom of a post-national era or as a pragmatic adjustment to the transnational realities of international migration. By contrast, the case of Denmark shows that dual citizenship may serve as a lever to protect the political community of the nation-state from terrorism and, as such, function as a tool of securitisation.

Keywords
Dual Citizenship • Terror • Postnationalism • Transnationalism • Securitisation

Introduction
The gradual acceptance of dual citizenship in Western countries since the early 1990s (Sejersen 2008; Spiro 2016) has been seen both as a symptom of an emergent post-national era (Soysal 1994; Spiro 2007) and as a pragmatic adjustment to the transnational realities of migration (Faist 2007a, 2007b; Gerdes & Faist 2007; Kivisto 2007; Kivisto & Faist 2007). According to both post-national (Soysal 1994; Spiro 2007) and transnational theories (e.g. Faist 2007a; Kivisto & Faist 2007), acceptance of dual citizenship is a means of liberalisation, in the sense that it reflects a strengthening of individual rights vis-à-vis the...
nation-state (Faist 2007b: 5). But is this assumption correct? Do nation-states allow multiple nationalities because they lack the capacity to resist or no longer have the incentives to enforce the principle of single citizenship, as Spiro (2016: 4) argues? And is acceptance of dual citizenship necessarily a means of liberalisation, emphasising individual rights at the expense of nation-state prerogatives?

This article uses the case of Denmark to critically discuss key assumptions in the theoretical literature on dual citizenship. When Denmark surprisingly accepted dual citizenship in 2015, the decision reflected two distinct lines of argument. First, accepting dual citizenship would allow Danes living abroad to keep their Danish citizenship. Second, because it is considered illegitimate to make people stateless, allowing dual citizenship would simultaneously allow for citizenship revocation of dual citizens who engage in or support acts of terror. Although it is clearly the case that many countries accepted dual citizenship in the 1990s and early 2000s to facilitate integration and that both immigrant-receiving and immigrant-sending countries today accept dual nationality to strengthen the ties to emigrants abroad, the Danish case suggests that dual citizenship also may serve as a lever to protect the political community of the nation-state from security threats. This rationale stands in contrast to how dual citizenship previously has been theorised, demonstrating that acceptance of dual citizenship may be part of an overall trend towards securitisation of citizenship (Aptekar 2016; Macklin 2007; Nyers 2009), in which states are willing to adopt extraordinary measures to ensure the security of their citizens (Wæver 1995).

The article continues by giving an historical account of the changing views on dual citizenship in international law, before presenting theories of dual citizenship developed in the 1990s and 2000s. Next, I turn to the case of Denmark, first, by outlining the development of the country’s citizenship policies since 2002, and, second, by conducting an empirical analysis of the arguments for the Danish Government’s law proposal of accepting dual citizenship, as they were posed in the Parliamentary debate following the law proposal in 2014. The analysis, as well as media coverage in the wake of the Parliamentary debate, demonstrates that citizenship revocation was one of the key arguments for accepting dual citizenship in Denmark. Based on this finding, I revisit theories of dual citizenship and discuss whether we are entering a new era in the history of dual citizenship – an era of securitisation – in which the grounds of acceptance of dual citizenship include nation-states’ wish and ability to expel terrorists from the national community.

**A brief history of dual citizenship**

The occurrence of multiple nationalities has been contested throughout the history of the nation-state (Kivisto 2007; Kivisto & Faist 2007; Spiro 2010, 2016; Triadafilopoulos 2007). According to Spiro (2016: 3), belonging to more than one nation-state was – in the first half of the 19th century – seen as ‘an offense to nature, an abomination on the order of bigamy’. Dual citizens’ divided loyalties and split allegiances in an era in which wars between
nation-states frequently took place were considered a considerable threat: dual citizens were regarded as a potential ‘fifth column’ within the national community and needed to be avoided.

In the latter half of the 19th century, a time period in which most Western countries developed nationality laws defining the terms for acquisition and loss of state membership, regulations with the intent of avoiding dual citizenship followed two different tracks. First, renunciation of original nationality was introduced as a requirement for naturalisation, and, second, those born with dual citizenship had to choose between the two (Spiro 2016). However, due to the interplay between different regimes of citizenship attribution by birth – some nation-states attributed citizenship to anyone born in their territory (*jus soli*), while others attributed citizenship only to children of citizens by the rule of descent (*jus sanguinis*) – the number of dual citizens increased (Faist 2007b). This was especially the case in immigrant communities in the US, which – in contrast to many European countries – has always based its nationality law on the *jus soli* principle (Spiro 2016: 31). The increasing number of dual citizens sparked bilateral conflicts between the US and European states: as citizenship entails the right of diplomatic protection from the state in the case of mistreatment by another state, dual citizenship creates conditions of interstate conflict (ibid.).

In the aftermath of World War I, the problems of multiple nationalities came to the forefront on the international agenda. The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws was meant to solve the core problems related to dual citizenship, e.g. dual citizens’ military obligations in the two countries, as well as the question of diplomatic protection. Indeed, the Convention made it clear that both dual citizenship and statelessness were undesirable statuses and that states should avoid both (Hailbronner 2006; Triadafilopoulos 2007). However, the Convention did not succeed in reaching a uniform solution as it also underscored that it is the prerogative of the state to define its nationality law, leaving much room for state discretion (Pilgram 2011: 5). As such, ‘The Hague Convention evidenced the international community’s continuing distaste for dual citizenship, but the effect was largely ineffectual at combating the status’ (Spiro 2016: 53).

The widespread ‘distaste’ for dual citizenship (along with statelessness) continued to be reaffirmed in the decades to come. The 1963 European Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, for example, confirms the general attitude among European countries that dual citizenship was regarded an undesirable status. In contrast to the 1930 Hague convention, however, the 1963 European Convention succeeded in solving the problem of multiple military obligations, by stating that dual citizens should be subjected to military service only in the state in which the individual was ordinarily resident. In fact, this solution reduced the negative aspects of dual citizenship considerably, both from the perspective of dual citizens themselves – who no longer had military obligations in more than one state – and from the perspective of states – making the narrative of dual citizens as a ‘fifth column’ less substantial. According to Spiro (2016: 61), it would still take decades before dual citizenship was decoupled from
marriage metaphors and widespread concerns over split loyalties, but with the enactment of the 1963 Convention, ‘the seeds for a tolerant posture were being laid’.

The major change in international law concerning dual citizenship came in 1997. The 1997 European Convention on Nationality – unlike all previous treaties – remained neutral to the status of dual citizenship. As such, it allows for multiple nationality and leaves it to each individual state to decide whether the status should be tolerated (Pilgram 2011). The convention reflects the growing tolerance for multiple nationalities in the international community and demonstrates a major change in the view of dual citizenship: from pure rejection, via being conceived of as an oddity, to the general acceptance, and even active encouragement, of the status today (Kivisto 2007; Spiro 2016).

According to Triadafilopoulos (2007), the principal norm driving the 1997 Convention was inclusion of immigrants and their descendants: ‘dual citizenship is now touted as a means of promoting and facilitating the naturalisation of legally resident foreigners and deepening the integration of second and third generations’ (Triadafilopoulos 2007: 35). Indeed, while dual citizenship was contested throughout the 19th and most of the 20th centuries because of the potential threats that dual citizens posed to national security, immigrants’ incorporation into host societies gradually became an important goal as more and more countries were transformed into net immigration countries from the 1970s onwards (Hansen & Weil 2001). The neutrality of The 1997 European Convention on Nationality must be seen in light of this development. In fact, in some cases, the convention even had a direct effect on the outcome of nationality law revisions: when Sweden changed its nationality law in 2001, which, among other liberalisations, allowed for dual citizenship – as the first country in the Nordic region – this was an explicit response to the changing view on multiple nationalities in international law (Bernitz 2012; Midtbøen 2015; Spång 2007). Many other countries also reformed their nationality legislations in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 2005, 63% of the countries in the Americas and 61% of the countries in Europe tolerated dual citizenship (Sejersen 2008: 553) – and the numbers have continued to increase ever since (Spiro 2016).

**Theories of dual citizenship**

The gradual acceptance of dual citizenship in Europe and elsewhere has been subject to theorising for about two decades. Theories of dual citizenship may be grouped into two broad categories: post-national theory and transnational theory (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). These theories have in common the idea that acceptance of dual citizenship is a response to globalisation and is a by-product of international migration, but they differ in what they conceive of as the driving force. According to post-national theory, introduced by Soysal (1994) in the mid-1990s and later developed by other scholars (e.g. Spiro 2007), the increase in dual citizenship is an inevitable consequence of the human rights regime emerging in the postwar period. Because individuals are granted rights as individuals regardless of national belonging, Soysal (1994) argues that personhood has
replaced nationhood as the key basis of civil, political and social rights. This has led to a situation in which nation-states gradually lose ground as membership organisations, creating a new form of membership – post-national membership – at the global level. Dual citizenship is granted an important place in post-national theory: the increasing tolerance of multiple nationalities from the early 1990s onwards is seen either as a transition period in which national citizenship will be replaced by post-national membership (Soysal 1994) or as a confirmation of the fact that the nation-state is no longer the key basis of rights and membership (Spiro 2007).

Post-national theory assumes that an increasing number of countries will accept dual citizenship because nation-states, in accordance to human rights, must accommodate a growing number of individuals with multiple national memberships. Transnational theory, by contrast, puts less focus on the human rights regime’s influence on nation-states’ ability to control their population. Rather, transnational theorists such as Faist and Kivisto (Faist 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Kivisto 2007; Kivisto & Faist 2007) claim that the increasing number of dual citizens is a mere reflection of international migration, which, by default, creates transitional spaces in which individuals have connections, family ties and sentimental bonds to more than one nation-state. According to this perspective, immigrant-receiving countries tolerate dual citizenship ‘mainly as a tool to promote the naturalization of immigrants and to close the gap between the resident population and the demos’ (Faist 2007c: 1). Immigrant-sending countries, on the other hand, tolerate that their emigrants abroad retain their original citizenship because it is viewed as economically beneficial to keep connections with citizens abroad (Faist 2007b: 5; see also Spiro 2016, Ch. 6). In the cases of both immigrant-receiving and immigrant-sending countries, however, ‘dual citizenship could be conceived as the political foundation of the transnational experience’ (Faist 2007b: 17).

Several scholars have questioned the claims put forward among both post-national and transnational theorists. Bosniak (2002), for example, finds that the idea of a weakened state sovereignty in post-national theory is overstated and points out that – regardless of the increasing numbers of states allowing dual citizenship – nationality law is still the prerogative of the nation-state. Bloemraad (2004) shows that the majority of naturalised immigrants in Canada report that they have only a Canadian citizenship, despite the opportunity of retaining citizenship in the country of origin, and argues that this finding questions the relationship between national citizenship and transnational activities. Finally, Joppke (2003) points out that immigrant-receiving states’ acceptance of dual citizenship may, but not necessarily do, reflect a liberal wish to facilitate immigrants’ naturalisation. Of course, the wish for immigrant incorporation has been crucial for the acceptance of dual citizenship in many national settings, most notably in Sweden (Bernitz 2012; Midtbøen 2015). Even in this context, however, the idea that acceptance of dual citizenship would strengthen the ties to Swedes living abroad was probably an important reason why most political parties agreed on the law amendment (Spång 2007). Maintaining ties to emigrants abroad was also key when Italy chose to accept dual citizenship in 1992 (Joppke 2003, 2010; Sejersen 2008).

As Joppke (2003) has pointed out, processes of globalisation, of which international migration is an intrinsic part (see also Waldinger 2013), may lead to both de-ethnicisation
and re-ethnicisation of citizenship. De-ethnicisation, regularly advocated by the political left, implies a liberalisation of nationality laws to facilitate immigrants’ incorporation in the political community of the nation-state. Re-ethnicisation, by contrast, is usually advocated by the political centre and centre-right and is the result of a wish to strengthening ties to emigrants. Importantly, acceptance of dual citizenship may be the result of both considerations: the political left would argue that acceptance of dual citizenship will increase immigrants’ naturalisation incentives and serve as an acknowledgement by the state that residence in the state territory matters for belonging. The political centre and centre-right, on the other hand, would argue that dual citizenship should be allowed for emigrants because membership in the nation is not (only) a question of territorial presence, but also a life-long sentimental bond (Joppke 2003).

Importantly, these points are primarily a critique of the post-national thesis. As noted by Joppke (2003: 454), the bi-directional possibility of nationality law reform, as well as the dependence on the political parties in government, ‘is missed by the linear and depoliticized accounts of post-national membership’. By contrast, the transnational thesis opens the possibility for acceptance of dual citizenship on multiple grounds, including the wish to retain ties to emigrants abroad. Nonetheless, the literature on transnational citizenship tends to view acceptance of dual citizenship as a means of liberalisation. Building on the work of Barth (1969), Faist (2007b), for example, distinguishes between fixed and porous boundaries of citizenship: ‘Citizenship with porous boundaries implies a high degree of tolerance of dual citizenship and rather short waiting periods for naturalization. Fixed boundaries refer to citizenship policies that emphasize rather restrictive rules, both in terms of naturalization – long time periods, strict qualifications – and of dual citizenship’ (Faist 2007b: 36). This clear relationship between boundaries of citizenship and acceptance of multiple nationalities has also been used to explain the peculiar case of the Netherlands, which accepted dual citizenship in 1992, by eliminating the renunciation of original citizenship demand, but chose to reinstate the demand in 1997 and thereby moving back to a single-citizenship regime in principle. According to de Hart (2007), the 1997 law change demonstrates the change in Dutch integration policies in general, moving from a pragmatist pluralist approach in the early 1990s to a more principled assimilationist approach in the end of the decade, with direct bearing on citizenship law.

Drawing on this body of theoretical work, I now turn to the case of Denmark – a country notoriously known for its restrictive naturalisation policies in the 2000s, but that nonetheless accepted dual citizenship in 2015. I start by describing the changing naturalisation regime from 2002 onwards, before I turn to the analysis of the political process leading to the recent acceptance of dual citizenship.

The case of Denmark

While all the Nordic countries have reformed their citizenship laws in the 2000s, the 1950 act remains in force in Denmark (Ersbøll 2015). Still, a number of changes in Denmark’s
nationality legislation were enacted in the 2000s, especially with regard to naturalisation. This is due to the fact that naturalisation requirements in Denmark are defined in guidelines issued by the responsible ministry, rather than being spelled out explicitly in the legal acts, as in Sweden and Norway (Midtbøen, Birkvad & Erdal 2018). The guidelines are subject to negotiation and are decided by the political parties that command the majority in the parliament. Between 2001 and 2011, the majority consisted of the right-wing parties The Liberal Party of Denmark, The Conservatives and The Danish People’s Party, and in this time period, a number of restrictive guidelines were issued.

The first changes came about in 2002, including the introduction of an oath of allegiance as a condition for naturalisation; an increase in the required time of residence from 7 years to 9 years; and a test in which prospective citizens were required to document Danish language proficiency and familiarity with Danish society, history and culture. In 2006, further restrictive measures were undertaken: from then on, applicants had to be financially self-sufficient, in the sense that he or she should not have received any welfare benefits for more than 1 of the previous 5 years, and the applicant’s familiarity with Danish society, culture and history had to be documented in the form of a new citizenship test. This test was a supplement to the even more rigid language proficiency requirements that had come into force by raising the standards defined by the regulations from 2002. Implementing these changes in 2006, Denmark had one of the most restrictive naturalisation policies in Europe (Brochmann & Seland 2010; Ersbøll 2015; Midtbøen 2015; Mouritsen & Olsen 2013).

However, the restrictive trend came to a preliminary end after the new Danish centre-left government came into office in the fall of 2011 (Ersbøll 2015). Several changes in a more liberal direction were implemented. As of 2014, children of immigrants who are born in Denmark are, under certain conditions, entitled to Danish citizenship by declaration (submitted before the age of 19 years), the language requirement is relaxed and the requirement for economic self-sufficiency has been changed, making it possible to naturalise with a receipt of social benefits for up to 2½ years within the past 5 years (Ersbøll 2015). Additionally, a new law reform, permitting immigrants to become Danish citizens without having to renounce their original citizenship as well as permitting Danes living abroad to keep or regain their Danish citizenship, was approved by the Danish Parliament in June 2014. The law came into force in the fall of 2015.¹

Denmark’s acceptance of dual citizenship came as a surprise to anyone who had followed the development of the country’s citizenship legislation in the 2000s. When the issue was discussed in a parliamentary debate in Folketinget in 2002, spurred by Sweden’s recent acceptance of dual citizenship, Danish citizenship was portrayed as unique and indivisible, and the dissolution of applicant’s previous citizenship was referred to as a key mechanism for establishment of Danish identity, which is required to maintain a social and cultural community (Holm 2006). In fact, the radical left-wing party The Red–Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) was the only party to vote for an acceptance of dual citizenship in 2002. The issue was also discussed in the Danish Parliament later on, two times in 2008 and again in 2011: the first time after a proposition by the liberal party The New Alliance (later renamed to The Liberal Alliance) and the latter two times after propositions by The
Danish Social-Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre). In all of these instances, the majority in Parliament, including The Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet) and The Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre), rejected the proposition. In 2014, however, there was consensus almost across the political spectrum that dual citizenship should be allowed – the right-wing party The Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) and The Conservative People’s Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti) being the only dissenters. What can account for this remarkable change in attitudes to dual citizenship among the majority of Danish political parties?

The Parliamentary debate about the government’s law proposal in 2014 reveals that two distinct arguments for dual citizenship were used. All representatives, from The Red–Green Alliance on the left to The Liberal Party of Denmark on the right, argued that Denmark should accept dual citizenship to allow Danish emigrants to keep or regain their Danish citizenship; in other words, a re-ethnicisation of citizenship, in Joppke’s (2003) terms. As the representative from The Liberal Party of Denmark put it:

“There is no need to force individuals to give up their original nationality because they want to be citizens of a new country. [...] In practice, the law will allow Danes, who settle in other countries, to retain their Danish citizenship while they also get a citizenship in their new homeland.

Similarly, the representative from The Socialist People’s Party stated:

“It makes perfect sense that Danish nationals in the future can retain their Danish citizenship, even if they move to another country and become citizens there [...]. Although some people choose to work in another country, it does not mean that their association and affiliation with Denmark become weaker.

On the left side of the political spectrum, the transnational reality of international migration was highlighted even more directly. In these statements, accepting dual citizenship was seen as a natural reflection of globalisation and the positive effects were seen as beneficial for both Danes abroad and immigrants living in Denmark. As pointed out by the representative of The Red–Green Alliance, for example:

“We live in a globalized world. Identity and belonging, emotions and loyalty, may well be divided in two. You can have home two places, and you can have your heart in several places. This applies both to Danes who travel the world and to other people who come here and become Danes.

However, the representatives from the Social Democrats and The Liberal Party of Denmark also argued along a very different line of reasoning: accepting dual citizenship would allow for citizenship revocation of dual citizens who engage in or support acts of terror. Since Denmark traditionally has based its legislation on the principle of citizenship exclusivity and the country obeys the important principle in international law, established by the 1930 Hague Convention, that no person shall be made stateless, accepting dual citizenship was
necessary to allow for citizenship stripping. As the representative of The Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre) stated in his introduction to the Parliamentary debate:

Today, we are writing a small piece of Danish history. Today, we are making a paradigm shift. Along with a number of other countries, we no longer wish to reject dual citizenship. We have changed our position, and our attitude for that matter. [...] Accepting dual citizenship allows us to expel Danish nationals who commit crimes against Denmark, like terrorism. If they are also a citizen of another country, then we can take that Danish citizenship from them and deport them to their original homeland.

Similarly, as argued by the representative from the Social Democrats:

Dual citizenship provides a better opportunity to expel people if they misuse their Danish citizenship. This is the correct way to do it, because we need to use dual citizenship to enable the positive development of democracy and not to cheat or to carry out acts of terrorism or major crimes in the country you choose to settle in.

This new argument – accepting dual citizenship as a security measure – had not been on the table in previous Parliamentary debates about dual citizenship in Denmark. Although terrorism had been discussed in the Scandinavian countries in the aftermath of 9/11 and the series of terror attacks on European soil in the following years, debates about the prevention of terrorist acts in this context arose with the phenomenon of ‘foreign fighters’. This term refers to young individuals, often born and bred in European countries, who travel to Syria or Iraq to join the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS]). Indeed, as the representative of The Liberal Party of Denmark stated in the Parliamentary debate:

There have been some Syria fighters who have Danish citizenship, and they are precisely the proof that when things are at stake, there is not a question of what is written in the passport, there is a question of what is in the heart. In these cases, we would have the opportunity to withdraw from the Syria fighter his Danish passport, granted that he also had a passport in another country, because he had gone to war and fought against Danish troops.

Although the left-wing politicians in the Danish Parliamentary debate included the ability of immigrants to retain their original citizenship when arguing that dual citizenship should be accepted in Denmark, the possibility of re-establishing ties to Danish emigrants abroad and the legal opportunity to strip terrorists from their Danish citizenship stand out as the key arguments that enabled Denmark’s U-turn on the question of dual citizenship. This conclusion is also supported by media reports from 2014, when the government’s law proposal attracted much attention among the Danish public. Under the heading ‘Dual citizenship may lead to more expulsion of criminals’, the newspaper Berlingske interviewed the Minister of Justice, Karen Hækkerup from the Social Democrats, before the Parliamentary debate on the issue. Hækkerup made it clear that the law proposal would make it possible for Danish authorities to revoke citizenship from terrorists:
[Allowing dual citizenship] will enable us to expel the criminals we previously have not been able to expel. [...] When people get the opportunity to get dual citizenship, we will actually have the opportunity to deprive them from their Danish citizenship at a later stage.

Explaining why the law proposal would also be supported by The Liberal Party of Denmark, which previously had been strongly against dual citizenship, Jan E. Jørgensen from The Liberal Party, said in the same interview:

There is a little twist to this. In the future, we will be able to deprive people of their Danish citizenship. For example, if they commit a crime against state security, such as terrorism, we can actually expel them.

This new argument seems to have changed the context of discussion in the Danish Parliament and created an interesting, new alliance between the left, the centre and the centre-right in Danish politics – combining elements of de-ethnicisation, re-ethnicisation and securitisation as grounds of acceptance. The existence of such an alliance is clearly illustrated by the change from the overwhelming support of the principle of single citizenship in 2002 to the overwhelming support of dual citizenship in 2014, leading to the de jure acceptance of dual citizenship in Denmark since 1 September 2015.

**Denmark in context: citizenship revocation as a counter-terror measure**

Denmark is not an outlier in making law amendments to increase security in the post-9/11 era. Indeed, one of the most striking trends in Western countries’ immigration policies in the 2000s is securitisation and strict border enforcement since the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001. The concept of securitisation is normally applied to situations in which the states transform certain individuals or groups of individuals into matters of security, enabling extraordinary means to be adopted to ensure the security of ordinary citizens (Wæver 1995). This trend towards securitisation has also spilled over to the field of citizenship legislation (Aptekar 2016; Macklin 2007; Nyers 2009). In the field of citizenship, the concept of securitisation best applies to citizenship revocation as a tool that is used to prevent individuals from joining terror organisations or travelling abroad as ‘foreign fighters’, as well as to punish individuals engaging in acts of terror (Joppke 2016).

Britain started this new trend by its change of the nationality law in 2002, which was a direct response to the 9/11 terror attacks. The change in legislation made it possible to revoke citizenship from naturalised individuals with dual citizenship who had done anything ‘seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom’ (Macklin 2007; Mills 2016; Sykes 2016). This provision was later broadened and, today, Britain allows citizenship stripping of both Britain-born and naturalised citizens granted that it is ‘conducive to the public good’ (Lavi 2011; Macklin 2014). Following Britain, countries like Canada and
Australia also opened up for citizenship revocation in 2014 and 2015, respectively, while countries such as Austria, the Netherlands and the US are currently contemplating (Bauböck & Paskalev 2015). Denmark was part of this new trend when the country allowed for dual citizenship while simultaneously opening up for citizenship revocation in 2015.

Interestingly, Norway has recently followed the Danish development. In December 2016, the right-wing government consisting of The Conservative Party [Høyre] and the right-wing Progress Party [Fremskrittspartiet] proposed a legal change providing for loss of citizenship concerning persons who have been convicted of serious criminal acts and criminal acts that defy fundamental national interests (The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2016). One year later, the Government – which after the 2017 election also included The Liberal Party [Venstre] – stated in its political platform [Jeløya-erklæringen] that the government would introduce dual citizenship in Norway. Similar to the Danish case, this came as a surprise as both The Conservative Party and The Progress Party traditionally had been strongly against dual citizenship. However, echoing the Danish Minister of Justice, Sylvi Listhaug from the Progress Party, who was then Minister of Immigration in Norway, said to the newspaper VG:

Dual citizenship is a prerequisite for depriving people of their Norwegian citizenship if they have committed terrorist acts or the like. This is one of the reasons why the Ministry of Justice now proposes to allow for dual citizenship.5

The formal proposition (The Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research 2018) was put forward to the Parliament in August 2018 and was discussed on December 6 the same year. All parties voted in favour of dual citizenship, except for The Norwegian Labour Party [Arbeiderpartiet] and the agrarian Centre Party [Senterpartiet], securing a strong parliamentary support for the Government’s proposition on the basis of a debate strikingly similar to the one in the Danish Parliament in 2014 (Midtbøen 2019).

A growing body of literature discusses the implications of the new trend towards citizenship revocation on the grounds of terrorism (e.g. Bauböck & Paskalev 2015; Hailbronner 2015; Herzog 2015; Joppke 2016; Lavi 2011; Macklin 2014; Macklin & Bauböck 2015; Spiro 2014). Predominantly, however, these discussions have concerned the normative aspects of citizenship stripping and not the implications of introducing citizenship revocation in traditional single-citizenship countries. The case of Denmark (and Norway) shows that the urge to introduce citizenship revocation on the grounds of terrorism in single-citizenship countries needs to be linked to acceptance of dual citizenship. This development fundamentally challenges established theories of dual citizenship.

**A third phase in the history of dual citizenship?**

The dominating theories of dual citizenship – stemming from the influential post-national and transnational theses developed in the 1990s and early 2000s – reflect important changes in citizenship policies at that time of conception. The number of countries
accepting dual citizenship, and not least the number of dual citizens in the world, was on the rise. This development started in the late 1980s, accelerated in the 1990s and boomed in the 2000s (Sejersen 2008). However, both post-national and transnational theorists tended to analyse the development in rather simplistic ways, focussing either on nation-states’ lack of power to resist (post-nationalism) or their active wish to incorporate immigrants into the political community (transnationalism). This is and has always been a rather skewed version of realities. Although the wish for immigrant incorporation was an important ground for accepting dual citizenship in many national settings, the wish to maintain ties to emigrants abroad has also been an important reason why many countries initially accepted dual citizenship (Joppke 2003, 2010; Sejersen 2008). In the 2000s, this re-ethnicisation of citizenship (Joppke 2003) gained ever more prominence as many countries in South and Latin America, Asia and Africa changed their previous reluctance towards dual citizenship and today embrace the status – because they have realised that emigrants can represent an important resource for the sending country (Spiro 2016). Acceptance of dual citizenship to be able to implement citizenship revocation, as happened in Denmark in 2015 and as will happen in Norway within a short amount of time (the amendment to the Norwegian Citizenship Act is expected to enter into force in 2020), represents yet another new development in the history of dual citizenship.

Given the current move towards the securitisation of citizenship (Aptekar 2016; Macklin 2007; Nyers 2009), one can even ask whether the trend towards citizenship revocation, in which dual citizenship – in most places – serves as a necessary precondition, represents a third phase in the historical development towards toleration of multiple nationalities. In what can be rightfully coined the era of the nation-state, lasting from the French revolution to the end of World War II, dual citizenship was categorically rejected by all nation-states, due to concerns about divided loyalties and split allegiances. In the first decades of the postwar period, the Western world went through a fundamental transformation spurred by the rapid growth in international migration, particularly from the mid-1960s onwards. This phase, lasting to the early 2000s, can probably be coined the era of globalisation. In this period, dual citizenship was gradually accepted – first in Britain, and later in France and Canada – and in the 1990s and early 2000s, a range of countries followed (Sejersen 2008; Spiro 2016). In many of these cases, the acceptance of dual citizenship was due to a wish to incorporate new immigrants into the political communities by speeding up the naturalisation process, while, in others, the key driver of acceptance was the ability to retain ties to emigrant communities. Both these drivers of change were fuelled by processes of globalisation.

In the post-9/11 period, however, things seem to have changed. Starting with Britain in 2002 and later followed by countries such as Australia, citizenship revocation of dual citizens was made possible by amendments in national legislations. In Denmark, most notably, dual citizenship was tolerated in 2015, among other grounds, to be able to expel prospective or actual terrorists from the national community. In what might be coined the era of securitisation, starting in 2001 and still continuing, the acceptance of dual citizenship has continued to increase. However, in this phase, a new function of dual citizenship seems
to have come to the fore: the ability to revoke citizenship and expel from the national territory individuals who support or engage in acts of terror may be introduced as an argument for accepting dual citizenship in traditional single-citizenship countries.

Conclusion

Linking the recent acceptance of dual citizenship in Denmark to the trend towards citizenship revocation in several Western countries, this article has contributed to the scholarly literature in two ways. Empirically, I have shown that, in the case of Denmark, dual citizenship was introduced partly to enable the authorities to expel future terrorists from Danish soil. Compared to previous analyses of processes leading to the acceptance of dual citizenship elsewhere, this is a fundamentally new rationale for introducing dual citizenship. The Danish case also suggests that future studies of acceptance of dual citizenship in single-citizenship countries need to carefully examine the key drivers of this development.

Theoretically, I have argued that although post-national and transnational theories of dual citizenship reflected the development of citizenship legislation of the era in which they were conceived, they cannot account for the new trend of citizenship revocation, in which dual citizenship may play a key role. Especially, post-national theories tend to take for granted that acceptance of dual citizenship is a means of liberalisation. However, the case of Denmark suggests that dual citizenship may be accepted on multiple grounds: as a wish to facilitate immigrants’ naturalisation (de-ethnicisation), as a wish to maintain or re-establish ties to Danes living abroad (re-ethnicisation) and as a wish to revoke citizenship from individuals who support or engage in acts of terror (securitisation). According to Joppke (2003), the direction of citizenship policies will depend on whether the political left or the political rights constitute the parliamentary majority. However, in the case of Denmark, an alliance between otherwise political opponents led to a mutual agreement of accepting dual citizenship, albeit on different grounds. The same development has taken place in Norway (Midtbøen 2019).

The facts that dual citizenship, in most places, is a precondition for citizenship stripping and that several countries now are opening up to citizenship revocation as part of their counter-terror strategies may point in the direction of an emerging third phase in the history of dual citizenship. Historically, dual citizenship was seen as an anomaly, a threat to national security resembling the threat of bigamy to the institution of marriage. As part of the related processes of globalisation, increasing international migration and the rise of the human rights regime, dual citizenship was gradually accepted from the 1970s onwards, although it was for decades considered an oddity. In the 1990s, the process of toleration accelerated and – fuelled by the 1997 European Convention on Citizenship, the first convention to allow for dual citizenship – the number of countries accepting dual citizenship boomed and has continued to increase ever since.
To the extent that a third phase in the history of dual citizenship is emerging, it seems tightly knit to the processes of securitisation taking place post-9/11. Indeed, citizenship revocation as a counter-terror measure was first introduced in Britain in 2002, shortly after 9/11, and was tightened after the London attacks in 2005. The fascinating process leading to acceptance of dual citizenship in the Danish case shows that the multiple arguments currently available for acceptance – immigrant incorporation, emigrant tie maintenance and citizenship revocation – created a new political alliance from the far-left to the centre-right in Danish politics. This suggests that acceptance of dual citizenship today continues to be reflections of both de-ethnicisation and re-ethnicisation of citizenship, but that securitisation of dual citizenship needs to be added to the mix of key drivers in the post-9/11 era.

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Notes

1. In 2015, a conservative government regained power in Denmark and the liberalisation of the naturalisation requirements was quickly annulled. The new government, however, decided to retain the acceptance of dual citizenship (Midtbøen et al. 2018).
2. An overview of the entire law process, including the Parliamentary debate, is available online (in Danish): http://www.ft.dk/samling/20141/lovforslag/l44/index.htm.
3. The complete interview is available online: https://www.b.dk/politiko/dobbelt-statsborgerskab-kan-foere-til-flere-udvisninger-af-kriminelle.
4. However, Canada decided to amend the law again in 2017. Since then, the country can no longer revoke citizenship on the grounds of terrorism.
5. The interview is available online: https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/BJl83E/aapner-for-dobbelt-statsborgerskap-for-aa-avskrekke-terror.

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