

# Decorporatization and organized interests in public policymaking in Norway: A tide that lifts all ships or an ebb tide leaving only the few afloat?

Daniel Arnesen 

Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway

**Correspondence:** Daniel Arnesen, Institute for Social Research, PO Box 3233 Elisenberg, N-0208 Oslo, Norway.  
Email: [daniel.arnesen@socialresearch.no](mailto:daniel.arnesen@socialresearch.no)

---

## Abstract

Over the past decades, there has been evidence of a shift from corporatist representation to pluralist policymaking in Norway and the neighboring Scandinavian countries. This article examines the policy involvement of voluntary associations and interest groups within the context of decorporatization and pluralization. Should decorporatization be understood as a tide that lifts all groups into public policymaking, or an ebb tide leaving only the few privileged afloat? By analyzing survey data on Norwegian voluntary associations and interest groups regarding their contacts with the parliament, government, and administration in 1983 and 2013, the article presents evidence of a growing mobilization and representation of citizen groups that have traditionally held a less prominent position in the policymaking process. However, economic groups have also increased or maintained their access to the parliamentary and governmental arenas, and insider access appears to persist as a factor in shaping group representation. Furthermore, the results indicate a widening gap in more frequent access between resource-rich and resource-poor groups. This leads to a somewhat contradictory conclusion: In one sense, decorporatization has been a tide lifting all ships, but in another, also an ebb tide leaving the few afloat.

---

## INTRODUCTION

In Norway and the neighboring Scandinavian countries, voluntary associations and interest groups play a crucial role in public policymaking (Ihlen et al., 2021). Traditionally, organized interests have been integrated into the public policymaking process through corporatist representation in administrative committees organized according to sectoral or functional principles (Blom-Hansen, 2000;

---

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

© 2023 The Authors. *Scandinavian Political Studies* published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Nordic Political Science Association.

Christensen & Egeberg, 1979; Rommetvedt, 2003). Within these committees, representatives of organized interests meet with civil servants acting on behalf of the government to engage in concertation on public policy (Nordby, 1994). However, in the past few decades, there has been increasing evidence of a decline in corporatism in all the Scandinavian countries (Rommetvedt, 2017). In Norway, the fragmentation of the political structure and civil society is argued to have weakened the conditions for corporatist political exchange. Importantly, the number of administrative committees with organized interest representation has significantly decreased since the 1980s (Öberg et al., 2011; Rommetvedt, 2005). Studies suggest that major interest groups have responded to this narrowing of the corporatist channel of influence by turning to political lobbying as a means to supplement traditional corporatist representation (Rommetvedt et al., 2013).

Understanding how the dynamics of interest politics have changed due to growing decorporatization is important for assessing the role that organized interests play in Norwegian democracy. The increased differentiation and specialization may increase civil society's capacity to monitor public policy and provide information and expertise to policymakers (Klüver, 2012). However, there is also the risk that such fragmentation makes it more challenging to determine which interests actually influence public policy and which do not (Tranvik et al., 2003). On the other hand, increased political fragmentation may offer better opportunities for groups typically excluded from formal policymaking to make their voices heard. Studies conducted in traditionally corporatist contexts indicate a rise in the mobilization and representation of citizen groups representing interests unrelated to the economy or vocations (Christiansen et al., 2018; Lundberg, 2012; Skorkjaer Binderkrantz et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the extent to which these groups become more significantly involved in the policymaking process compared to traditional corporatist groups remains unclear.

Norway remains “a state-friendly society and inclusive polity” where the political and social system invites adversaries and interest groups to participate in public policymaking (Grendstad et al., 2006). Traditional corporatist groups, especially economic interest groups, are generally well-established, large, and rich in resources. Their position in the political system still makes them desirable partners to public policymakers, and their greater resources enable them to exert a more concerted political effort. However, persistent logics guiding the inclusion of interest groups in policymaking may favor groups that have already assumed a central position in the political system (Skorkjaer Binderkrantz et al., 2016). While the public policymaking process may include a wider range of organized interests compared to the heyday of corporatism, new mechanisms may reinforce inequalities in interest group representation.

The aim of this article is to contribute to the literature on interest politics in the context of decorporatization and pluralization in Scandinavia by examining the policy involvement of voluntary associations and interest groups in Norway. Metaphorically speaking, the article seeks to determine whether

decorporatization—or rather the underlying changes in the political structure and civil society landscape—can be seen as a tide that lifts all ships, or an ebb tide leaving only the few afloat, resulting in an uneven playing field. Empirically, the article addresses the following questions: To what extent has there been a rise in the mobilization and representation of citizen groups in Norway, similar to trends observed elsewhere? To what extent do these groups have access to political arenas such as the parliament, government, and the public administration, and is their access at the expense of or alongside traditional, economic groups? Does insider status related to corporatist representation still matter for groups' involvement? Moreover, have the resources possessed by groups become a more influential factor?

The analysis is based on surveys conducted in 1983 and 2013 among Norwegian voluntary associations and interest groups. The surveys encompass various types of organizations, including cultural, sports and recreational associations, religious associations, social and humanitarian associations, public interest and identity groups, and business, professional, and labour associations. The surveys offer valuable data on contacts of these organizations with central public authorities during a crucial period marked by decorporatization and pluralization in Norway.

## THE DECLINE OF CORPORATISM AND RISE OF PLURALIST POLICYMAKING IN NORWAY

A key institutional characteristic of corporatism is the privileged and institutionalized integration of organized interests into the processes of policy preparation and implementation (Christiansen et al., 2010). Voluntary associations and interest groups are “granted a representational monopoly by the state in exchange for observing certain controls on their choice of leaders and articulation of demands” (Schmitter, 1974, p. 94). A crucial aspect is the capacity of associations and groups to supply “encompassing interests” based on broad-based membership (Grömping & Halpin, 2019). Specifically, corporatism functions as a system of political exchange, where selected organized interests are offered political influence in return for making concessions or providing support to the government, such as ensuring their members' compliance or acquiescence with public policy (Molina & Rhodes, 2002; Öberg et al., 2011). Corporatism is often contrasted with pluralism, where a multitude of organized interests competes on relatively equal terms for access to and influence in the policymaking process with the state as an intermediary (Lijphart, 2012). The participation of voluntary associations and interest groups in the policymaking process under pluralism is less institutionalized, with political exchange being centered on their capacity to mobilize policy-relevant resources in decision-makers in different arenas demand. While some groups may have more influence than others, it is also

assumed that conflicting interests and coalition building prevents any one group's dominance (McFarland, 2007).

Modern Norwegian corporatism emerged during the 1950s as a framework for policy concertation under the majority government of the Labour Party. Its objective was to incorporate major economic interest groups, including business associations, professional groups, and labour unions (often organized under peak umbrella associations), into the process of policy preparation and implementation through representation in administrative committees (Nordby, 1994). However, although the system was centered on economic and labour market policy, committees were also organized around functions such as healthcare, education, and defense (Christensen & Egeberg, 1979). In fact, even before the more comprehensive corporatist system took shape, welfare groups like social and humanitarian associations were already represented in administrative committees (Moren, 1958). In this period, many important policy decisions were made within these committees, while the parliament assuming a more minor role (Rokkan, 1966). For associations and groups outside the corporatist structure, such as identity groups and public interest groups, the avenues for seeking political influence were relatively limited. Although written comments offered some opportunities for these groups to express their views, the corporatist system primarily favored a privileged minority of associations and groups (Christensen & Egeberg, 1979).

During the late 1980s, Norwegian corporatism experienced a decline. The number of policy-preparing committees and implementation bodies with interest group representation decreased significantly in the decades leading up to the 2010s (Rommetvedt, 2017). Furthermore, there was a notable decline in the participation of associations and groups in these committees (Sivesind et al., 2018). This shift was driven by several factors. Firstly, the growing complexity of the social structure and the political and administrative system necessitated increased coordination across policy areas. As a result, there was a push to scale back the expansive committee system, which was perceived to be dominated by sectoral interests (Rommetvedt, 2003). Additionally, there was a weakening of the government's capacity to participate in corporatist arrangements due to “the increasing assertiveness of the opposition in the Storting [the parliament] and [...] parliamentary fragmentation” (Öberg et al., 2011, p. 356). Party fragmentation and minority governments led to greater dissent and instability, while MPs gained a more independent position. Simultaneously, the parliament enhanced its administrative capacity and became a more active, politically influential institution (Rommetvedt, 1998).

On the other hand, the capabilities of groups to participate in corporatist arrangements have been weakened by increased interest group fragmentation, declining membership rates, and a shift away from “old” class-based politics (Öberg et al., 2011). From the 1960s to the 1990s, membership in traditional, broad-based associations experienced a significant decline, particularly those

rooted in traditional popular movements. This trend was observed not only in Norway but also in other countries, with labour unions and their membership numbers levelling off during this period (Visser, 2006; Wallerstein et al., 1997). Concurrently, “new politics” movements emerged, focusing on social issues such as second-wave feminism, LGBTQ+ rights, and environmentalism, as well as specialized citizen groups (Sivesind et al., 2018). Participation in associations and groups became less driven by ideology and more focused on specific activities and issues, resulting in decreased member activity and loyalty. Consequently, many associations and groups underwent a process of professionalization (Eimhjellen et al., 2018). As a result of these changes, traditional corporatist partners became less capable and committed to providing the encompassing interests demanded by decision-makers, while also facing increasing competition from new associations and groups.

Studies indicate that major interest groups have adapted to this narrowing of the corporatist channel of influence by shifting focus towards political lobbying. With the increased power of the parliament compared to the executive, parliamentary lobbying has become a more effective strategy for gaining influence. As a result of their exclusion from corporatist policymaking committees, traditional interest groups are increasingly employing lobbying tactics to engage with elected officials in the parliament and government, and civil servants in the public administration (Rommetvedt et al., 2013). Furthermore, the fragmentation of the government, characterized by a transition from integrated ministerial structures to single-purpose models and increased agencification (Christensen et al., 2008), and the increasing mediatization of politics (Skogerbø & Karlsen, 2021) has transformed the strategic terrain for groups seeking influence. Policymaking now occurs in a more complex environment that necessitates coordination across multiple political arenas and encompasses a broader array of organized interests. This shift has resulted in a gradual displacement of corporatist representation by a less institutionalized, pluralist pattern of policymaking, signifying a process of decorporatization (Rommetvedt, 2005; Uhre & Rommetvedt, 2019).

## **INTEREST GROUP DYNAMICS IN THE CONTEXT OF DECORPORATIZATION AND PLURALIZATION**

Growing decorporatization and pluralization are trends observed not only in Norway but also in its neighboring Scandinavian (and Nordic) countries (Rommetvedt, 2017). Several recent studies have examined how the mobilization and representation of interest groups in the public policymaking process have changed in response to these developments. Typically, this research focuses on interest group access, which Binderkrantz et al. (2017) defines as “when a group has entered a political arena (parliament, administration, or media), passing a threshold controlled by relevant gatekeepers (politicians, civil

servants, or journalists.” Interest groups encompass a wide range of organizations, including not-for-profit associations, private firms, and public institutions. In the Norwegian context, these groups are predominantly organized as voluntary membership associations or other types of nonprofit organizations representing individuals, firms, public institutions, and other organizations (Sivesind et al., 2018). In this article, the term “voluntary associations and interest groups” is used as a broader concept encompassing these various types of organizations, including both latently political groups (such as leisure associations and religious groups) and manifestly political groups (such as public interest groups, identity groups, business associations, and labour unions).

Scandinavian research has explored whether decorporatization has created more favorable conditions for the public policy involvement of groups that were traditionally excluded from corporatist representation. A specific focus has been on citizen groups, which are defined as groups advocating for the interests of social groups or broader causes unrelated to vocations or the economy (Vesa et al., 2018). In a study of Danish interest groups, Binderkrantz et al. (2015) demonstrate that citizen groups still encounter difficulties in gaining access to corporatist committees. However, they are relatively more successful in seeking representation in the parliament and media. Another study by Skorkjaer Binderkrantz et al. (2016) which examines changes in citizen group representation in Denmark from 1975 to 2017, reveals that despite a significant mobilization of citizen groups, these groups struggle to overcome persistent patterns of inclusion and exclusion in administrative settings. In Sweden, Lundberg (2012) investigates associational participation in written consultations and finds that the state has shifted away from traditional conflict-oriented associations. This shift has led to a more prominent role for service organizations and public benefit-oriented groups. These studies highlight the evolving dynamics of interest group involvement in following decorporatization and raise the question of whether similar trends have taken place in Norway.

### **Political opportunity, resource exchange, and resource mobilization**

The concept of political opportunity can be useful in examining some of the changes in interest politics following the processes of decorporatization and pluralization. Giugni (2011) defines political opportunity as those “aspects of the political system that affects the possibilities that challenging groups have to mobilize effectively.” In the framework proposed by Kriesi et al. (1992), these aspects encompass the formal institutional structure, informal procedures and strategies with regards to challengers, and power relations between established actors. Limited political opportunities tend to favour the institutionalization of policymaking in favour of established groups and foster conservatism among potential challengers, as the risks outweigh the rewards. On the other hand,

when political opportunities are more abundant, the risks decrease and more advantageous conditions are provided for challengers (Minkoff, 1999).

Corporatism is characterized by a relatively limited political opportunity structure. The involvement of organized interests in the policy process revolves around integration within closed administrative committees, where government-sanctioned groups are formally included while others are informally excluded. Skorkjaer Binderkrantz et al. (2016) point out that there is “a high level of conservatism in corporatist structures: once groups have assumed central positions in the system, they may be used to keep competitors from entering and gaining access.” However, the fragmentation of the political structure compels interest groups to seek influence across multiple political arenas, as the role of administrative committees are weakened. In a context where civil society has also become more fragmented, new groups may seek to capitalize on opportunities to influence public policy. While the power of established interest groups remains significant, their influence is increasingly dependent on their ability to provide information and expertise to policymakers, rather than relying solely on broad-based membership and encompassing interests.

However, the representation of groups in the policymaking process is not only determined by political opportunities; it also relies on their capacity to mobilize the necessary resources. Lobbying requires groups to mobilize resources for establishing offices, hiring administrative and political staff, developing expertise, and engaging with policymakers (Dür & Mateo, 2013). Additionally, groups still need to attract members, volunteers, and supporters. They are crucial for groups to aggregate societal interests and maintain support (Daugbjerg et al., 2018; Flöthe, 2019; Fraussen & Beyers, 2016). The resource exchange model conceptualizes access of associations and groups to the political arena as contingent upon their ability to provide policy-relevant access goods (Bouwen, 2002). In this framework, access follows a supply and demand logic: influence-seeking groups are granted access in exchange for delivering policy-relevant goods to political decision-makers. These access goods can include technical knowledge and expertise, information about the needs of core constituencies, and direct support for policy decisions, among other examples. Furthermore, the demands for these goods may vary among decision-makers in different political arenas and group types. Elected officials may value certain types of goods, while civil servants may value others.

This model suggests that differences in group involvement in the policy-making process can be explained by variations in the goods they can mobilize and provide (see also Binderkrantz et al., 2015). The literature often highlights a bias toward economic groups (Schlozman et al., 2012). Economic groups represent well-defined constituencies, such as businesses, trades, industries, professions, occupations, and workers. These groups possess specialized and sector-specific resources and expertise that decision-makers often seek

(Bouwen, 2004). Particularly, civil servants value the input of these groups as, because “to prepare technically implementable and politically feasible decisions, [they] need technical information and information about the political support of core actors” (Binderkrantz et al., 2015, p. 100). Elected officials in parliament and government also find the expertise and support provided by these groups to be valuable in their decision-making processes (Eising, 2007). Furthermore, in the context of corporatism, economic groups have been valued partners due to their ability to ensure their members' compliance and support for policy.

In contrast to economic groups, citizen groups represent interests that are more diffuse. These groups mobilize on behalf of identity groups, such as patients, consumers, or minorities, or focus on broader public causes like environmentalism and social justice. Because they are conceived around either larger crosscutting issues or narrower groups, citizen groups are generally less capable of delivering encompassing interests that are valued in the corporatist context. However, with the increasing importance of “new politics” issues to voters, policymakers have started recognizing the significance of input from public interest and identity groups (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2015). Growing social and political complexity likely requires elected officials to navigate the interests of different groups while appealing to their core supporters. Additionally, civil servants in the bureaucracy need the knowledge and “street-level” expertise possessed by these groups, as it helps in formulating viable policy proposals.

Different types of groups are expected to have varying capacities for resource mobilization. Economic groups benefit from comprehensive financial support and technical information. In the Norwegian context, economic groups are well-funded, primarily through membership fees, and have less financial dependence on the state, although some may receive public funding (Sivesind et al., 2018). Their strong and independent financial position allows them to establish professionalized organizations and allocate resources to political activities. On the other hand, citizen groups, with their narrower issue focus and more diffuse constituencies, face limitations in mobilizing financial, human, and organizational resources. Their specialized nature and narrower focus may hinder their ability to build professionalized organizations due to inadequate resources. Public interest groups are also susceptible to free-rider problems, which can further impede their resource mobilization capacity (Olson, 1965). This limited resource situation potentially constrains their ability to deliver policy-relevant access goods to the same extent as economic groups, thus affecting their access and influence in a more pluralist environment.

Lastly, traditional corporatist groups may adapt their political strategies in response to shifting circumstances and maintain their access and influence (Rommetvedt et al., 2013). These groups, often older, larger, and resource-rich, have established themselves as legitimate policy actors and possess the capacity to engage in concerted lobbying efforts. While the loss of corporatist privileges



may occur, these groups can leverage their capacities and resources to gain access to decision-makers in the parliament, government, and public administration (Binderkrantz et al., 2015). Furthermore, being a corporatist insider can still confer advantages. Organized interests that participate in administrative committees have privileged access to the policymaking process and may be perceived as more legitimate than other groups. They can also leverage their position in the policymaking process to lobby for access to resources, creating a cumulative advantage that enables them to maintain their position (Binderkrantz et al., 2015; Rommetvedt et al., 2013; Skorkjaer Binderkrantz et al., 2016).

The literature provides support for two contrasting but not necessarily contradictory expectations regarding the impact of decorporatization and pluralization. On one hand, there is an expectation of increased mobilization and representation of citizen groups in the political process. On the other hand, there is the expectation that pluralization leads to increased inequality in group access. Binderkrantz et al. (2015, p. 95) describe a pattern of privileged pluralism in their study of Danish interest groups, which refers to a system “a system where multiple political arenas provide opportunities for multiple interests but where unequally distributed resources produce cumulative effects.” Similarly, Grossmann (2012) uses the term “institutionalized pluralism” to emphasize how the most established and legitimate groups are more likely to be incorporated into the policymaking process. Furthermore, studies conducted in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden suggest that traditional corporatist groups have maintained their privileged positions despite increasing pluralism (Lundberg, 2020; Vesa et al., 2018).

## DATA AND METHODS

The analysis in this article is based on data obtained from cross-sectional surveys of Norwegian voluntary associations and interest groups carried out by research groups at the University of Tromsø in 1983 (Hallenstvedt, 1983) and at the Centre for Research on Civil Society in Oslo in 2013 (Gulbrandsen & Sivesind, 2013). To compile lists of associations and groups, the researchers used sources such as public registries, telephone directories, and newspapers. In the most recent survey, they also used internet searches and social media. The identified populations included all types of nonprofit-based associations and groups with a national scope of activity, including business associations, professional groups, and labour unions. It is assumed that the resulting lists are relatively comprehensive representations of the actual populations (cf. Rommetvedt et al., 2013; Sivesind et al., 2018). The number of associations and groups identified in the 1983 survey was 1648, while in the 2013 survey, it increased to 3395.

Both surveys were conducted using a census approach, meaning they were administered to the entire population of associations and groups. The surveys targeted individuals holding top positions such as secretary general, chief administrative officer, or similar representatives within each organization. The questionnaire used in the 2013 survey was specifically designed to facilitate comparison with the 1983 survey and included many of the same questions regarding associations and groups' contacts with public authorities. In the 1983 survey, a postal questionnaire was employed, resulting in a total of 1120 responses, representing a response rate of 68.4%. On the other hand, the 2013 survey utilized a web-based questionnaire that was sent via email. This survey garnered 914 responses, corresponding to a response rate of 27.5%. For the purpose of analysis, the focus is narrowed down to the groups that had reported contacts with central public authorities. In the 1983 survey, there were 784 such groups, while in 2013 the number was 506.

The difference in response rates between the two surveys can be attributed to several factors. One possible reason is survey fatigue, as associations and groups are increasingly approached for surveys, which may lead to a lower willingness to respond. Additionally, changes in the civil society landscape could play a role. The ease of establishing national-level associations and groups has been facilitated by technological advancements such as the internet and social media. As a result, there is a greater diversity of associations with varying levels of activity and limited resources. Representatives of these smaller associations may have limited time or interest in participating in surveys (Sivesind et al., 2018). In the 2013 survey, efforts were made to specifically target associations and groups that had previously participated in surveys, aiming to capture responses from a relatively active segment of the population. Although the response rate was lower, the data still provides valuable insights into changes among active organizations over this period. However, it is important to interpret the results with caution due to the difference in response rates between the two surveys.

## Variables

The measurement of group access is based on respondents' self-reported frequency of contacts with various public authorities. Respondents were given the initial question: "Do you have regular contacts with central public authorities?." If they answered affirmatively, they were then asked if and how often—yearly, monthly, weekly or daily—they had contacts with the following authorities: the parliament and parliamentary committees, MPs and party groups, the cabinet, and the ministries. The main analysis focuses on access to three key arenas: the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas. Parliamentary access is determined by aggregating contacts with parliamentary committees, MPs, and party groups. Governmental access is indicated by contacts with the cabinet, which encompasses ministers, political secretaries,

and political advisors. Administrative access is indicated by contacts with the ministries.

The coding of the groups in the surveys differentiates between two main categories: citizen groups and economic groups. To establish this categorization, the International Classification of Non-Profit Organizations was used as a basis (United Nations, 2003). The coding of citizen groups and economic groups sought to approximate existing classifications in the Scandinavian and other interest groups literature (see Baroni et al., 2014; Binderkrantz et al., 2015). Citizen groups includes identity groups representing social groups such as patients and disabled persons, LHBTQ, and ethnic minorities, public interest groups promoting broader causes or issues, welfare groups providing activities and services related to education, health, and social service, leisure groups providing social and recreational activities and religious groups. Economic groups include business associations promoting, regulating, and safeguarding the interests of branches of business, professional groups promoting, regulating, and protecting professional interests and labour unions promoting, protecting, and regulating the rights and interests of employees.

A binary variable is used to indicate whether a group was represented in one or more administrative committees, based on a question of whether they participated in public boards, councils, or commissions. This variable aims to explore the differences in access to the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas between “insider” groups that have representation in administrative committees and “outsider” groups that do not. To examine the role of group resources, a variable indicating paid staff size is utilized as a proxy measure for the financial and professional resources of the groups. In the 1983 survey, data on group employment was collected through a question asking for the number of employees. In the 2013 survey, employment data was obtained from the Norwegian State Register of Employers and Employees, which provides information on employment relationships reported by all employers. It is important to note that this operationalization of group resources may have limitations, particularly in capturing nuances at the lower end of the scale. For example, among groups with no employees or those with only a few employees, there may still be variations in the resources they possess. However, the variable is log-transformed in the analysis to account for the fact that the addition of one unit is more impactful at the lower end of the distribution and to mitigate the influence of extreme outliers.

In addition to the main variables of interest, several control variables are included in the analysis. Group age is one such control variable, which measures the number of years since the group's founding at the time of the surveys. Group age is included because older groups may have had more time to establish themselves, build resources, and develop relationships with decision-makers, potentially affecting their access. Group form is another control variable that captures the organizational structure of the groups. It

distinguishes between federated associations with local and regional chapters, centralized associations that operate at the national level only, and umbrella associations that have other national organizations as their members. The group form variable is included because different organizational structures may have implications for resource mobilization and institutional legitimacy, which can influence group access (Marquez, 2016). Membership size is controlled for using variables that measure the number of individual members, corporate members (firms), and organizational members (other associations and groups) within each group. The inclusion of these variables recognizes that the size of the membership base may be indicative of the group's representativeness and legitimacy, as well as its capacity to mobilize resources and exert influence. Like the variable measuring staff size, these variables are log-transformed (Table 1).

**TABLE 1** Independent variables in the main analysis.

	1983				2013			
	No. of obs.	%/Mean	SD	Min/Max	No. of obs.	%/Mean	SD	Min/max
Group type	784				506			
Citizen group		27%			506	43%		
Economic group		73%				57%		
Group age	784	41.7	29.5	0/222	506	38.6	37.5	0/252
Group form	784				506			
Federated		48.6%				35.0%		
Singular		47.8%				53.4%		
Umbrella		3.6%				11.6%		
Size of membership (log-transformed)								
Individuals	784	4.43	4.01	0/13.9	506	4.34	3.68	0/15.2
Firms	784	1.39	2.25	0/9.3	506	0.93	1.93	0/10.2
Organizations	784	0.24	0.86	0/5.9	506	0.50	1.33	0/11.0
Represented in the administrative committee	784	44%			506	22%		
Staff size (log- transformed)	784	1.26	1.39	0/7.840	506	1.37	1.31	0/6.5

Abbreviations: Max, maximum; min, minimum.

## EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

### The changing landscape of interest group representation

Table 2 illustrates the distribution of voluntary associations and interest groups in the overall actual population and among survey respondents that reported having regular contacts in the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas in 1983 and 2013. Comparing the distributions makes it possible to assess changes in the representation of different types of groups.

The table provides evidence of increased mobilization and representation of citizen groups over the examined period. It demonstrates that the share of citizen groups' in the overall population rose from 48% in 1983 to 57% in 2013. Additionally, the distribution of group types in the three political arenas reflects a similar shift as observed in the population at large. The share of citizen groups with contacts in the parliamentary arena rose from 34% to 67%, in the governmental arena from 33% to 65%, and in the administrative arena from 34% to 62%. In the parliamentary arena, the change appears to be driven by an increase in identity groups, but to some extent also leisure groups and public interest groups. The same trend is partially observed in the governmental and administrative arenas, with welfare groups also contributing more significantly to the increase in the former. Interestingly, the increase in citizen group representation appears to have taken place in categories where one typically finds specialized groups rather than among broad-based interest groups.

Conversely, the share of economic groups decreased both in the overall population and in all three political arenas. However, it is important to note that this change primarily reflects the growth in citizen groups rather than a decline in economic groups. The table shows that the total number of associations and groups increased from 1983 to 2013. Even though the distribution of the two group types changed, the number of economic groups in fact increased somewhat. A decrease in the share of business associations and to some extent professional groups was the main driver behind the decline in the overall share of economic groups in the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas.

### Interest group access to the parliament, government, and administration

Table 3 illustrates the changes in contacts for each group type across the three political arenas. This approach goes beyond simply examining the distribution of groups in each arena and instead offers insights into changes in the access of the two group types and facilitates comparisons between them.

The table demonstrates an increase in the share of citizen groups and economic groups that had contacts in the parliamentary arena, both on yearly

**TABLE 2** The distribution of associations and groups in the population and in the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas, 1983 and 2013. Percent.

	Group population <sup>a</sup>			Parliamentary arena			Governmental arena			Administrative arena		
	1983	2013	Diff.	1983	2013	Diff.	1983	2013	Diff.	1983	2013	Diff.
Citizen groups	48	57	19	34	67	33*	33	65*	32*	34	62	28*
Leisure	28	25	17	8	19	11*	3	14	11*	13	21	8*
Welfare	4	5	1	4	8	4*	3	12	9*	5	8	3*
Public interest	9	15	6	14	19	5	19	20	1	9	15	6*
Identity	7	12	5	8	21	13*	8	18	10*	7	18	11*
Economic groups	52	40	-12	65	33	-32*	66	35	-31*	66	38	-28*
Business	29	15	-14	34	15	-19*	39	22	-17*	36	18	-18*
Professional	20	21	1	19	10	-9*	12	5	-7*	23	14	-9
Labor unions	3	4	1	12	8	-4	15	8	-7*	7	7	0
Total	100	100		100	100		100	100		100	100	
Observations	1880	3395		244	232		122	109		538	345	

<sup>a</sup>See Sivesind et al. (2018, p. 78).

\* $p < 0.05$ .

**TABLE 3** Changes in the share of citizen groups and economic groups with yearly and monthly or more frequent contacts in the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas, in 1983 and 2013. Percent.

	1983		2013		Difference	
	Yearly	Monthly or more frequent	Yearly	Monthly or more frequent		
Parliamentary arena						
Citizen groups	18	16	23	24	5	8*
Economic groups	15	15	22	23	7*	8*
Governmental arena						
Citizen groups	11	6	11	10	0	4*
Economic groups	9	6	11	12	2*	6*
Administrative arena						
Citizen groups	29	43	32	32	3	-13*
Economic groups	16	51	32	42	16*	-9*

Note: No. of observations 1983/2013: Citizen groups = 213/289, economic groups = 571/217.

\* $p < 0.05$ .

and monthly or more frequent basis. For citizen groups, the share with yearly contacts saw a rise from 18% to 23% (although the difference is not statistically significant), and the share with monthly or more frequent contacts increased from 16% to 24%. Among economic groups, the corresponding figures showed an increase from 15% to 22% for yearly contacts and from 15% to 23% for monthly or more frequent contacts. Changes in the governmental arena were less pronounced, but both citizen and economic groups experienced an increase in the share of contacts on a monthly or more frequent basis. Among citizen groups, it increased from 6% to 10%, and among economic groups, it increased from 6% to 12%. Both in the parliamentary and governmental arenas, the rate of increase was similar for both group types.

There are also noticeable changes in administrative contacts. The share of citizen groups with yearly contacts in the administrative arena remained relatively stable, while those with monthly or more frequent contacts decreased from 43% to 32%. On the other hand, the share of economic groups with yearly contacts significantly increased from 16% to 32%, while the share with monthly or more frequent contacts decreased from 51% to 42%. The table suggests that there to some extent was a shift in the share of groups with more frequent contacts from the administrative arena to the parliamentary and governmental arenas.

**TABLE 4** Change in the share of insider and outsider groups with yearly and monthly or more frequent contacts in the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas, in 1983 and 2013. Percent.

	1983		2013		Difference	
	Yearly	Monthly or more frequent	Yearly	Monthly or more frequent	Yearly	Monthly or more frequent
Parliamentary arena						
Outsider	11	7	21	18	10*	11*
Insider	23	26	26	44	3	18*
Governmental arena						
Outsider	5	3	9	7	4	4
Insider	16	10	18	25	2	15*
Administrative arena						
Outsider	23	32	34	30	11*	-2
Insider	16	71	25	57	9*	-14*

Note: No. of observations 1983/2013: Outsider: 443/396; Insider: 341/110.

\* $p < 0.05$ .

Table 4 shows the share of insider and outsider groups (i.e., that were represented in an administrative committee) that had contacts in the three arenas in 1983 and 2013.

The table indicates and increase in the share of outsider groups with yearly contacts and monthly or more frequent contacts in the parliamentary arena. The share rose from 11% to 21% for yearly contacts and from 7% to 18% for monthly or more frequent contacts. Among insider groups, there was a significant increase in the share with monthly or more frequent contacts, from 26% to 44%, but no significant change in the share with yearly contacts. In contrast, the table shows no significant change in the share of outsiders with contacts in the governmental arena, which remained relatively low in both years. However, the share of insider groups with monthly or more frequent contacts increased from 10% to 25%.

The share of insider groups with frequent contacts in the administrative arena decreased from 71% to 57%, while the share of outsiders with yearly contacts increased from 23% to 34%. It can be observed that outsider groups primarily gravitate towards the parliamentary arena, and to some extent the administrative arena, while insider groups significantly increased their contacts in both the parliamentary and governmental arenas. The decrease in insiders' contacts in the administrative arena may be attributed to decorporatization.



**TABLE 5** Ordinal logistic regression of yearly and monthly or more frequent contacts in the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas.

	Parliamentary arena			Governmental arena			Administrative arena		
	1983	2013	Pooled	1983	2013	Pooled	1983	2013	Pooled
Citizen groups	1.341 (1.45)	1.211 (0.97)	1.254 (1.60)	1.431 (1.37)	1.096 (0.36)	1.266 (1.29)	0.859 (-0.81)	0.683** (-2.01)	0.794* (-1.81)
Group age	0.995 (-1.64)	0.998 (-0.69)	0.997 (-1.59)	1.001 (0.27)	1.000 (0.11)	1.001 (0.23)	1.000 (0.12)	1.000 (0.12)	1.000 (-0.13)
Group form <sup>a</sup>									
Centralized	0.550*** (-3.22)	1.127 (0.52)	0.721** (-2.32)	0.544*** (-2.59)	1.254 (0.72)	0.747 (-1.64)	0.384*** (-5.56)	1.125 (0.57)	0.550*** (-4.62)
Umbrella	0.463 (-1.64)	1.664 (1.34)	0.942 (-0.23)	0.504 (-1.21)	2.616*** (2.15)	1.517 (1.46)	0.377** (-2.37)	1.069 (0.18)	0.604** (-1.98)
Size of membership									
Individuals	1.049* (1.81)	1.053 (1.63)	1.047** (2.41)	1.023 (0.73)	0.983 (-0.44)	1.002 (0.08)	1.032 (1.20)	0.969 (-1.03)	1.014 (0.78)
Firms	1.048 (1.12)	1.082 (1.60)	1.054* (1.70)	1.097** (2.00)	1.134** (2.28)	1.101*** (2.77)	1.039 (0.97)	1.184*** (3.29)	1.066** (2.10)
Organizations	1.219** (2.18)	1.199** (2.54)	1.219*** (3.58)	1.129 (1.14)	1.079 (0.78)	1.103 (1.36)	1.434*** (3.97)	1.198** (2.25)	1.314*** (4.13)

(Continues)

TABLE 5 (Continued)

	Parliamentary arena			Governmental arena			Administrative arena		
	1983	2013	Pooled	1983	2013	Pooled	1983	2013	Pooled
Insider (represented in committee)	3.515*** (7.10)	2.840*** (4.67)	3.336*** (8.82)	2.988*** (4.78)	2.969*** (4.18)	3.151*** (6.79)	4.005*** (8.58)	2.023*** (3.11)	3.421*** (9.28)
Staff size	1.285*** (4.41)	1.586*** (5.07)	1.296*** (4.77)	1.290*** (3.89)	1.754*** (5.57)	1.317*** (4.53)	1.134* (1.90)	1.801*** (5.98)	1.192*** (2.70)
2013			1.950*** (3.48)			1.350 (1.15)			0.762* (-1.77)
2013 # Staff size			1.173* (1.69)			1.253** (2.13)			1.243** (2.24)
/									
Cut1	5.468*** (6.53)	4.713*** (4.45)	6.357*** (8.64)	17.44*** (9.60)	18.58*** (6.40)	18.87*** (11.42)	0.610** (-2.03)	0.944 (-0.19)	0.605*** (-2.62)
Cut2	16.40*** (10.20)	15.80*** (7.37)	19.92*** (13.11)	56.64*** (12.37)	50.40*** (8.12)	55.58*** (14.42)	1.697** (2.13)	4.750*** (4.96)	2.041*** (3.63)
Observations	784	506	1290	784	506	1290	784	506	1290
pr2	0.1120	0.1008	0.1128	0.0999	0.1380	0.1129	0.1251	0.1118	0.1024

Note: Odds ratios ( $z$  statistics in parentheses).

<sup>a</sup>Reference group: Federated.


\*  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## The relationship between interest groups' resources and political access

Regression analysis is employed to analyze the changing impact of group resources on access to the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas. Table 5 displays the results of ordinal regression analysis, examining the frequency of associations and groups' contacts in these arenas. Separate models are computed using data from 1983 and 2013. It is important to note that the coefficients of logistic models are not directly comparable across models (Mood, 2009). Consequently, pooled models are constructed, incorporating an interaction term between year and staff size. These pooled models allow for an examination of differences in the effect of group resources on contacts across the 2 years.

The table reveals that in both 1983 and 2013, groups with greater resources were more likely to have contacts on a monthly or more frequent basis in all three political arenas, in comparison to groups with fewer resources. The coefficient of the log-transformed staff size variable indicates that as the number of employees within a group increased, the odds of having monthly contacts significantly rose in comparison to a combination of yearly contacts and no contact across all models, while controlling for other variables.

The main question of interest is whether group resources have become more important. When comparing the impact of group resources from 2013 to 1983



**FIGURE 1** Average marginal effects of the year on the frequency of contacts in the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas.

in the pooled models, the findings demonstrate a greater effect on monthly or more frequent contacts in the parliamentary, governmental, and administrative arenas. The interaction term between year and staff size is statistically significant in all three models, indicating a significant change over time. Figure 1 illustrates the differences in the effects between the 2 years. The disparity is more pronounced in the parliamentary and governmental arenas compared to the administrative arena, but the figure depicts that there is an effect across all three arenas. Regarding yearly contacts, there is a small yet noteworthy increase in the effects of resources in the parliamentary and governmental arenas. However, in the administrative arena, there seems to be a slight decrease in the impact of resources.

## CONCLUSION

This article presents evidence of increased mobilization and representation of citizen groups in the political and administrative system following the decline of corporatism in Norway. This lends support to the argument that decorporatization has acted as a tide that lifts all ships. The descriptive findings indicate that citizen groups achieved more equal representation compared to economic groups. These results align with previous studies in other Scandinavian countries (Lundberg, 2012; Skorkjaer Binderkrantz et al., 2016). However, economic groups increased their access to both the parliamentary and governmental arenas. This finding is consistent with research that highlights the adaptive strategies employed by these groups (Binderkrantz, 2015; Rommetvedt et al., 2013; Mach et al., 2020). Furthermore, the findings also indicate greater inequality in access. First, insider groups have expanded their access to the parliamentary and governmental arenas. Second, the disparity in access between resource-rich and resource-poor groups increased. This lends support to the argument that decorporatization has entailed a more uneven playing field. In this sense, it has in some ways also acted as an ebb tide leaving only the privileged few afloat.

Consequently, the findings lead to a somewhat contradictory conclusion: On one hand, there is evidence to suggest that the widening of political opportunities and changes in the social and political context of public policymaking in Norway, following decorporatization, have created more favorable conditions for citizen groups. Associations and groups continue to play a crucial role in facilitating citizen participation in the policymaking process, and perhaps even more so than in the past. On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest that established and resource-rich groups nonetheless enjoy a more privileged position in the policymaking process, in line with traditional interest group theory. This may indicate a shift towards privileged or institutionalized pluralism in Norway (Binderkrantz, 2015; Grossmann, 2012). One possible interpretation is that corporatism regulated access in a way that

ensured more equitable access based on financial and professional resources compared to pluralism.

This article contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it offers insight into the significant changes in the participation of associations and groups in the policymaking process in Norway, following decorporatization and pluralization (Rommetvedt, 2003; Rommetvedt et al., 2013; Uhre & Rommetvedt, 2019). Secondly, it contributes to the broader Scandinavian and European interest group literature by providing evidence from the Norwegian context. In doing so, it adds to the growing body of research on the role of organized interests in traditionally corporatist countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland. (Binderkrantz et al., 2015; Christiansen et al., 2018; Lundberg, 2012, 2020; Rommetvedt, 2017; Rommetvedt et al., 2013; Skorkjaer Binderkrantz et al., 2016; Vesa et al., 2018). Lastly, the article highlights the need for further understanding of group representation, particularly with regard to the role of group resources in influencing policy.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks are extended to the Politics, Democracy and Civil Society group at the Institute for Social Research and the Centre for Research on Civil Society and Voluntary Sector, as well as to the anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive feedback.

## CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

## ORCID

Daniel Arnesen  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2026-1684>

## REFERENCES

- Baroni, L., Carroll, B. J., William Chalmers, A., Marquez, L. M. M., & Rasmussen, A. (2014). Defining and classifying interest groups. *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 3(2), 141–159. <https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2014.9>
- Binderkrantz, A., Pedersen, H., & Beyers, J. (2017). What is Access? A discussion of the definition and measurement of interest group access. *European Political Science*, 16(3), 306–321. <https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2016.17>
- Binderkrantz, A. S., & Christiansen, P. M. (2015). From classic to modern corporatism. Interest group representation in Danish public committees in 1975 and 2010. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(7), 1022–1039. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.1000365>
- Binderkrantz, A. S., Christiansen, P. M., & Pedersen, H. H. (2015). Interest group access to the bureaucracy, parliament, and the media. *Governance*, 28(1), 95–112. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12089>
- Blom-Hansen, J. (2000). Still corporatism in Scandinavia? A survey of recent empirical findings. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 23(2), 157–181. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.00035>
- Bouwen, P. (2002). Corporate lobbying in the European Union: The logic of access. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9(3), 365–390. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760210138796>

- Bouwen, P. (2004). Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions. *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(3), 337–369. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00157.x>
- Christiansen, P. M., Mach, A., & Varone, F. (2018). How corporatist institutions shape the access of citizen groups to policy-makers: Evidence from Denmark and Switzerland. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(4), 526–545. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1268194>
- Christiansen, P. M., Nørgaard, A. S., Rommetvedt, H., Svensson, T., Thesen, G., & Öberg, P. (2010). Varieties of democracy: Interest groups and corporatist committees in Scandinavian policy Making. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 21(1), 22–40. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-009-9105-0>
- Christensen, T., & Egeberg, M. (1979). Organized group-government relations in Norway: On the structured selection of participants, problems, solutions, and choice opportunities. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 2(3), 239–260. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1979.tb00221.x>
- Christensen, T., Lie, A., & Læg Reid, P. (2008). Beyond new public management: Agencification and regulatory reform in Norway. *Financial Accountability & Management*, 24(1), 15–30. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0408.2008.00441.x>
- Daugbjerg, C., Fraussen, B., & Halpin, D. (2018). Interest groups and policy capacity: Modes of engagement, policy goods and networks. In X. Wu, M. Howlett, & M. Ramesh (Eds.), *Policy capacity and governance: Assessing governmental competences and capabilities in theory and practice* (pp. 243–261). Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54675-9\\_11](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54675-9_11)
- Dür, A., & Mateo, G. (2013). Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in five European countries: Gaining access or going public? *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(5), 660–686. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12012>
- Eimhjellen, I., Steen-Johnsen, K., Folkestad, B., & Ødegård, G. (2018). Changing patterns of volunteering and participation. In B. Enjolras, & K. Strømsnes (Eds.), *Scandinavian civil society and social transformations: The case of Norway* (pp. 25–65). Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77264-6\\_2](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77264-6_2)
- Eising, R. (2007). Institutional context, organizational resources and strategic choices: Explaining interest group access in the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 8(3), 329–362. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116507079542>
- Flöthe, L. (2019). The costs of interest representation—A resource perspective on informational lobbying. *European Political Science Review*, 11(2), 161–178. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773919000055>
- Fraussen, B., & Beyers, J. (2016). Who's in and who's out?: Explaining access to policymakers in Belgium. *Acta Politica*, 51(2), 214–236. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2015.9>
- Giugni, M. (2011). Political opportunity: Still a useful concept? In M. Hanagan, & C. Tilly (Eds.), *Contention and trust in cities and states* (pp. 271–283). Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0756-6\\_19](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0756-6_19)
- Grendstad, G., Selle, P., Strømsnes, K., & Bortne, Ø. (2006). *Unique environmentalism: A comparative perspective*. Springer.
- Grömping, M., & Halpin, D. R. (2019). Does group engagement with members constitute a “beneficial inefficiency”? *Governance*, 32(3), 511–529. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12388>
- Grossmann, M. (2012). *The not-so-special interests: Interest groups, public representation, and American governance*. Stanford University Press.
- Gulbrandsen, T. J., & Sivesind, K. H. (2013). *Nasjonale organisasjoner: En første oversikt [National organizations: A first overview]. Report 2013-5*. Centre for Research on Civil Society and Voluntary sector.
- Hallenstvedt, A. (1983). *Norske organisasjoner [Norwegian organizations]*. Tanum-Norli.

- Ihlen, Ø., Binderkrantz, A. S., & Öberg, P. O. (2021). Lobbying in Scandinavia. In E. Skogerbø, Ø. Ihlen, N. N. Kristensen, & L. Nord (Eds.), *Power, communication, and politics in the Nordic countries*. University of Gothenburg.
- Klüver, H. (2012). Informational lobbying in the European Union: The effect of organisational characteristics. *West European Politics*, 35(3), 491–510. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.665737>
- Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Giugni, M. G. (1992). New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 22(2), 219–244. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1992.tb00312.x>
- Lijphart, A. (2012). *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries* (2nd ed.). Yale University Press.
- Lundberg, E. (2012). Changing balance: The participation and role of voluntary organisations in the Swedish policy process. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 35(4), 347–371. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2012.00292.x>
- Lundberg, E. (2020). Toward a new social contract? The participation of civil society in Swedish Welfare Policymaking, 1958–2012. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 31(6), 1371–1384. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9919-0>
- Mach, A., Varone, F., & Eichenberger, S. (2020). Transformations of Swiss neo-corporatism: From pre-parliamentary negotiations towards privileged pluralism in the parliamentary venue. In R. Careja, P. Emmenegger, & N. Giger (Eds.), *The European social model under pressure: Liber Amicorum in honour of Klaus Armingeon* (pp. 51–68). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8\\_4](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27043-8_4)
- Marquez, L. M. M. (2016). The relevance of organizational structure to NGOs' approaches to the policy process. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 27(1), 465–486. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9555-5>
- McFarland, A. S. (2007). Neopluralism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10(1), 45–66. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072005.152119>
- Minkoff, D. C. (1999). Bending with the wind: Strategic change and adaptation by women's and racial minority organizations. *American Journal of Sociology*, 104(6), 1666–1703. <https://doi.org/10.1086/210220>
- Mood, C. (2009). Logistic regression: Why we cannot do what we think we can do, and what we can do about it. *European Sociological Review*, 26(1), 67–82. <https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcp006>
- Molina, O., & Rhodes, M. (2002). CORPORATISM: The past, present, and future of a concept. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5(1), 305–331. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112701.184858>
- Moren, J. (1958). *Organisasjonene og forvaltningen: En studie i bruken av permanente råd og utvalg med representasjon fra interessegrupper [Organizations and the public administration: A study on the use of permanent councils and committees with representation from interest groups]* (Vol. 3). Forlagsaksjeselskapet Bedriftsøkonomen.
- Nordby, T. (1994). *Korporatisme på norsk: 1920–1990 [Norwegian corporatism: 1920–1990]*. Universitetsforlaget.
- Öberg, P., Svensson, T., Christiansen, P. M., Nørgaard, A. S., Rommetvedt, H., & Thesen, G. (2011). Disrupted exchange and declining corporatism: Government authority and interest group capability in Scandinavia. *Government and Opposition*, 46(3), 365–391. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2011.01343.x>
- Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups* (Vol. 124). Harvard University Press.
- Rokkan, S. (1966). Norway: Numerical democracy and corporate pluralism. In R. A. Dahl (Ed.), *Political oppositions in western democracies* (pp. 70–115). Yale University Press.

- Rommetvedt, H. (1998). Norwegian parliamentary committees: Performance, structural change and external relations. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 4(1), 60–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13572339808420539>
- Rommetvedt, H. (2003). *The rise of the Norwegian parliament*. Frank Cass.
- Rommetvedt, H. (2005). Norway: Resources count, but votes decide? From neo-corporatist representation to neo-pluralist parliamentarism. *West European Politics*, 28(4), 740–763. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500216674>
- Rommetvedt, H. (2017). Scandinavian corporatism in decline. In O. Knutsen (Ed.), *The Nordic models in political science: Challenged, but still viable?* (pp. 171–192). Fagbokforl.
- Rommetvedt, H., Thesen, G., Christiansen, P. M., & Nørgaard, A. S. (2013). Coping with corporatism in decline and the revival of parliament: Interest group lobbying in Denmark and Norway, 1980–2005. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(4), 457–485. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012453712>
- Schlozman, K. L., Verba, S., & Brady, H. E. (2012). *The unheavenly chorus: Unequal political voice and the broken promise of American democracy*. Princeton University Press.
- Schmitter, P. C. (1974). Still the century of corporatism? *The Review of Politics*, 36(1), 85–131.
- Sivesind, K. H., Arnesen, D., Gulbrandsen, T., Nordø, Å. D., & Enjolras, B. (2018). An organizational landscape in transformation. In B. Enjolras, & K. Strømsnes (Eds.), *Scandinavian civil society and social transformations: The case of Norway* (pp. 67–116). Springer International Publishing. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77264-6\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77264-6_3)
- Skogerbø, E., & Karlsen, R. (2021). Media and politics in Norway. In E. Skogerbø, O. Ihlen, N. N. Kristensen, & L. Nord (Eds.), *Power, communication, and politics in the Nordic countries* (pp. 91–111). University of Gothenburg.
- Skorkjaer Binderkrantz, A., Fisker, H. M., & Pedersen, H. H. (2016). The rise of citizen groups? The mobilization and representation of Danish Interest Groups, 1975–2010. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 39(4), 291–311. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12073>
- Tranvik, T., & Selle, P. (2003). *Farvel til folkestyret?: Nasjonalstaten og de nye nettverkene*. Gyldendal Akademisk.
- Uhre, A. N., & Rommetvedt, H. (2019). Civil associations and interest groups in the policy-making process: Pluralisation and generalisation of interests. *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, 8(2), 233–253. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-019-00049-w>
- United Nations. (2003). *Handbook of national accounting: Handbook on non-profit institutions in the system of national accounts*. Statistics Division.
- Vesa, J., Kantola, A., & Binderkrantz, A. S. (2018). A stronghold of routine corporatism? The involvement of interest groups in policy making in Finland. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 41(4), 239–262. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12128>
- Visser, J. (2006). Union membership statistics in 24 countries. *Monthly Labor Review*, 129(1), 38–49. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23805340>
- Wallerstein, M., Golden, M., & Lange, P. (1997). Unions, Employers' associations, and wage-setting institutions in Northern and Central Europe, 1950–1992. *ILR Review*, 50(3), 379–401. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001979399705000301>

**How to cite this article:** Arnesen, D. (2023). Decorporatization and organized interests in public policymaking in Norway: A tide that lifts all ships or an ebb tide leaving only the few afloat? *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12259>